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Abstract:
In an increasingly interconnected global order, governments are experiencing growing
pressures to engage in cooperative and integrative processes. Indeed, regionalism has become
a primary objective for all regions. East Asia is no exception. Using the "European Union"
as a model, scholars generally regard East Asian regionalism as a "failure." With an emphasis
on 'process' over 'progress' East Asian regionalist institutions lack the institutional formality
and accountability mechanisms valued by Western standards on regionalism. I do not dispute
these claims about East Asian regionalism so much as to propose a different interpretation
allowed by applying a different theoretical lens. I subscribe to a relationalist framework that
emphasizes relations vis-a-vis networks and identity, instead of a substantialist framework
(the study of physical institutional entities). This allows me to analyze the ways in which
relational processes in East Asia are changing the very identities and objectives of member
nations. I analyze foreign policy speeches and documents released by the People's Republic
of China during the span of 3 essential time periods: the Mao Zedong era, the era of reform
led by Deng Xiaoping, and the current administration of President Hu Jintao. In these
documents I examine particular shifts in China's guiding foreign policy ideology in order to
observe a growing Chinese 'regional identity'. Through this I defend the idea that there is a
dynamic and differentiated 'East Asian' Model' of regionalism.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter I: The 'Distinct or Deficient' Debate over East Asian Regionalism

Chapter 2: 'Naming' The Dragon: The Debate Surrounding Chinese Identity

Chapter3:A Relationalist Model for a Regionalist Process

Chapter 4: Relational Processes of Identity Formation and the Evolution of

China's Regional Identity

Conclusion
Bibliography

Abbreviations

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

APT

ASEAN Plus Three

APEC

Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARF

ASEAN Regional Forum

CCP

Chinese Communist Party

EU

European Union

PRC

People's Republic of China

SCO

Shanghai Cooperative Organization

INTRODUCTION
With the perceived success of the European Union, regional integration has
become a highly discussed and debated issue. This discussion of whether to
undertake the project of regionalism, referring to government-led initiatives towards
integration, comes at a time when states find themselves embedded into the political
narrative of globalization and interdependence. Thus there exists an external
pressure for governments to engage in cooperative and integrative processes in order
to adapt to the increasingly interconnected global order.
The same pressure from above has been felt in East Asia1. Given the attention
bestowed on economic and security issues in East Asia, an increasing amount of
literature has been devoted to analyzing the processes of regionalism that have been
undertaken and the impediments to a "successful" integration. However, the
impediments identified by this literature are based on a Western, primarily
European experience and cannot be easily applied in a region with such a complex
political, social, and cultural composition. Furthermore, this literature applies a
"substantialist" theoretical lens that focuses the study of regionalism on essentialized
entities and institutions rather than on the relations that constitute the identities
and interests of actors. In doing so, the literature on regionalism has failed to
address the interstices between relations, identity, and regionalist processes.

1.Relationalismvs. Substantialism
For the purposes of this paper East Asia refers to the members of ASEAN Plus 3 that includes Indonesia, Laos,
Singapore, Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Vietnam, Japan, China, and South
Korea.

In their work, 'Relations Before States', international relations scholars
Patrick T. Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon describe the ways in which contemporary
sociological theory is divided between 'substantialism' and 'relationalism'. The
arguments presented within this debate help to explain why regionalist scholars
primarily focus on regionalist institutions and discount the importance of regional
relations.
According to Jackson and Nexon, substantialism maintains that the
ontological primitives of analysis are physical or material entities. More
importantly substantialism assumes a sequence in which entities exist prior to
interaction and that the very definition of relations should be viewed as interactions
between pre-given entities. A majority of IR theories are substantialist in nature,
focusing mainly on entities such as the state. The idea of the state as the primary
actor assumes that relations occur among pre-existing entities, objectifying relations
and to subsuming them under characteristics of states. In other words states are seen
as possessors of identity, norms, and preferences. Objectifying conceptions of
identity, norms, and preferences ignores the underlying relations that compose them.
While substantialism maintains that the ontological primitives of analysis are
visible entities, relationalism instead argues that relations shape identity conceptions
that in turn generate particular norms and preferences. While substantialism
assumes a sequence in which entities exist prior to interaction and that the very
definition of relations should be viewed as interactions between given entities,

P. T. Jackson and D. H. Nexon. "Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World
Politics." European Journal of International Relations 5.3 (1999): 291-332.

relationalists argue that interactions exist logically or analytically prior to entities,
and can in fact create and transform the entities themselves. The divide between
substantialist and relationalist IR theory suggests that scholars should attempt to
resist the temptation to objectify and reify relations into state and entity analysis,
and must instead focus on the processes behind relations. Two terms used by
Jackson and Nexon-process, and yoking-help capture the ways in which
relationalism can be used to re-interpret world affairs.
By treating all processes as being under the ownership of certain entities,
scholars fail to study how processes alter relations between entities. For example,
Jackson and Nexon use the example of the spreading of a rumor to demonstrate the
pitfalls of treating processes as properties of entities.
If we study the rumor as an owned process we are not really studying the 'spread'
of the rumor. Rather we are studying how interactions of individuals changed the
rumor ...this is not particularly useful if we want to study how the process, which is
the spreading of the rumor, alters the relations...the bonds between group
members, the separation between members of the group and those outside of it. 3

This analogy accurately conveys relationalism's emphasis on the study of process.
Instead of focusing on the product or outcome (the rumor), Jackson and Nexon
advocate that scholars should study the spreading of the rumor and the ways in
which interaction between members alter the rumor itself. It also demonstrates how
framing processes as owned entities overemphasize the control and influence of the
parties involved. Instead of focusing on member's abilities to change and influence
the direction and nature of the process in question, the study of any interactive
process requires an examination of the relations between members and the ways in
relations alter the members involved.
Jackson and Nexon, pg. 302

Jackson and Nexon's process of yoking refers to ways in which configurations
of relations take on agent properties. The core of the idea is that 'sites of difference',
which are culturally and dialogically negotiated, create spatial notions of 'inside' and
'outside'. Such sites of difference can be viewed as processes that signal differences
within a given site in relation to other sites. Additionally, it is within 'insides' that
processes of Weberian rationalization occur, thus creating agent properties%The
important conclusion in terms of conceptualizations of the 'self vis-A-vis the other is
that " boundaries come before the entities which they bound and the relations of
'inside' and 'outside' precede supposed substances like 'the state' and help to produce the effect of substantiality.5" In a relational view of identity, then, the 'self and
the 'other' are not presupposed as material manifestations or entities, but rather
relations that precede entities, shaping and transforming their properties and
conceptions of identity.

11. Regionalism and the China Case

Thus, instead of using formal institutions, such as Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as the
object of analysis, I apply a relationalist lens to the study of regionalism, observing
the ways in which on-going East Asian relations cultivate and promote a 'regional
identity,' that shifts norms and preferences. Relationalist theory can be applied to
regionalism by examining the ways in which relations induce the creation of an
internalized regional identity within member nations. In this, I follow constructivist

5
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thinkers. Constructivist scholars have long held that the composition of a nation's
identity defines its national interests, legitimizing and influencing its foreign policy.
As Lisbeth Aggestam notes, conceptions of national identity and the consequence of
its articulation and internalization becomes integrated in a cognitive framework or
"prism" through which the political reality informing foreign policy is interpreted
and determined6. At the same time, examining the effects of identity on foreign
policy requires thinking in terms of mutual feedback processes between relations
and contexts. Therefore, the ability of relations to define a nation's identity in
regional terms reinforces the application of a relationalist framework in explaining
not only a specific nations foreign policy, but also regional dynamics as a whole7.
I use China as a case study for several reasons. First, China's precipitous rise

and growing influence in the international system has generated an enormous
amount of scholarly and governmental attention. It's political, economic, and
societal actions have placed China not only at the center of the mainstream media
but also at the forefront of IR scholarship. Secondly, China embodies the many
interstices that exist between identity, relation, and regionalism. As we shall see,
China continuously engages in processes in which it re-imagines and re-invents its
'self in order to produce grand ideologies and strategies to guide its domestic and
foreign policy. China has also increased efforts to improve relations with other East
Asian countries making it an ideal study for the ways in which regional relations
Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price. Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New
Agenda. London: Macmillan, 2000.
As Hettne elaborates, the relationship between region and actor reveal that regions are composed of
the practices of the regional community that are in turn defined by identity. B.Hettne, ,
Regionalism and World Order. In Farrell et al. (Eds.) Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and
Practice. (2005)Pluto Press: Ann Arbor MI.

cultivate a regional identity. Finally, having studied abroad in Beijing at Peking
University, I've had the opportunity to engage not only with Chinese scholars but
have also continued to develop my study of the Chinese language. Focusing my
project on China has allowed me to incorporate primary documents written in
Chinese with interviews I conducted with Professors at Peking University that have
greatly contributed to my study.
In this project, I analyze foreign policy documents and speeches that span
across three key time periods in recent Chinese history: the Mao Zedong era, the era
of reform led by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, and the current administration led
by President Hu Jintao. In reading these documents, I use a model, which I will
discuss further below, to examine conjunctural shift-points in China's guiding
foreign policy ideology in order to observe the ways in which relational processes in
East Asia are changing the very identities and objectives of member nations.
Indeed, using China as a case study, I find that the observed flaws of East
Asian regionalism do not indicate a failure or stagnation of the East Asian project of
integration, but rather signal the creation of a differentiated regionalism model.
Through an analysis of particular shifts in Chinese foreign policy ideology, I argue
that, in applying a relationalist model, there is evidence demonstrating that
relational processes have led to China's gradual internalization of a 'regional identity'
that has in turn influenced its foreign policy ideology and behavior.
111. Methodology
In order to analyze the processes by which regional relations have instilled a
growing 'regional identity' within China's self-conceptualization and geopolitical

consciousness, this study will primarily utilize a thematic and chronological analysis of
two major shifts in China's East Asian foreign policy. I will engage in a text-based
content analysis of translated speeches, government White Papers, and other PRC
issued documents to illustrate a temporally shifting narrative from the late- Mao to the
current Hu Jintao era. In comparison with a policy analysis, a textual analysis of these
documents allows for a deeper study of Chinese identity read through expressed policy
preferences or actions, transcending mere realist notions of interests, motives, or
intentions. These texts function as windows into a 'national psyche,' where we are able
to examine Chinese notions of 'self and 'other' and the complex schemas by which
China identifies itself in relation to the East Asian region.
Klaus Krippendorff defines content analysis as "a research technique for
making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the
contexts of their use." He identifies key rules by which content analysis can be used in
studying policy issues8. First he lists three main characteristics of text-based content

1. A close reading

of a relatively small amount of textual matter;

2. The rearticulation (interpretation) of given texts into new (analytical deconstructive,
emancipatory, or critical) narratives that are accepted within particular scholarly communities
that are sometimes opposed to positivist traditions of inquiry; and

3. The analyst acknowledges working within hermeneutic circles in which their own socially or
culturally conditioned understandings constitutively participate.

Following these rules, Krippendorff argues that content analysis should be applied to
a limited number of documents and used to interpret these texts according to a
Klaus Krippendorff. Content Analysis: a n Introduction to Its Methodology. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage, 2004.
9
Krippendorff, pg. 17

theoretical narrative that is accepted within the scholarly community.
Since this project will draw inferences from a reading of Chinese speeches and
documents it is important to ground such inferences in a methodological framework
according to these three principles. Text-based content analysis lends itself
particularly well to this purpose as it requires the analyst to draw on "Knowledge of
the empirical relationship between these speech acts (the correlations that connect
one to another) and the strengths (prelocutionary forces) or particular utterances,"
and, most importantly, the network of connections that leads from texts to
inferences regarding the research question at hand.10 This emphasis on a 'network of
connections' embodied within documents is especially well-suited for a relational
study that seeks to observe the effects of dynamic and multi-dimensional, regional
relations. The second characteristic in particular allows for a relationalist lens to
serve as a 'new narrative' by which one may rearticulate and interpret given texts.
Furthermore, the analysis of Chinese speeches and texts are particularly
appropriate in examining Chinese identity, as Allen Chun argues, since Chinese
writing and key terms serve as a form of expression of identity in Chinese culture:
The point of the matter is that terms are important, not only for what they
mean semanticallybut for what they mean pragmatically, as well--that is
to say, given the speaker's intended usage. Moreover, meanings change in
spite of the fixed character of the words themselves; thus, the authority of
language can be understood not only as a function of a speaker's implicit
interpretation but also as a purposive strategic act ...That is to say, behind
the message itself, it is more important to know who is really speaking,
how statements are produced and disseminated, how they relate to the
'other'll.

This passage hints at the important contributions that a relationalist, content-based
analysis can add to the study of Chinese identity. As Chun states, Chinese terms and
Krippendorff,pg. 34
Allen Chun, "Fuck Chineseness: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity." Boundary
2

23.2 (1996): 111.

writing are windows through which we may observe how China relates to a perceived
'other'. A serious engagement and rearticulation of Chinese texts and terminology
allows us to transcend assumptions about the fixed nature of particular terms; this
invites a deeper investigation into changing definitions of terms within changing
contexts. In sum, content analysis provides a methodological framework by which
we may extract inferences (in this case on Chinese identity) by linking textual data to
the theoretical narrative and context posited by the relational theory of regional
dynamics.
While this study does make use of a variety of secondary sources, most of the
primary documents were collected while on a research trip to Beijing in the winter of
2010. These documents were originally in Chinese and were then translated by a

Chinese aide and myself. Reading these documents in the original language is an
essential part of this research because this is primarily a study of identity and how
China views itself. The ways in which we conceptualize identity are often dictated
and guided by the language in which we are able to narrate our own schemas and
streams of consciousness. Furthermore the Chinese language poses an interesting
challenge when conducting any textual analysis, as many English translations often
miss the many nuances that are difficult or nearly impossible to capture in English.
In addition, government speeches or documents often employ diplomatic formalities
and thus English translations may not capture slight differences between documents
that are often times identical year to year except for a few key changes. Thus reading
these documents in Chinese allows us to draw a more accurate portrayal of Chinese
identity that is defined in terms that are not exogenously applied.
Though many documents emerge out of regional forums, the forums in which

these documents were presented represent particular institutions, such as ASEAN
Plus Three (APT) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), that according to a
relationalist view serve as mediums and channels through which countries like China
may negotiate and express their own identities. Thus the institution itself is not the
primary concern in reading these documents, but rather serves as a setting in which
we can observe articulations of (regional) identity. Speeches given by foreign
ministers and Chinese leaders, government position papers, and presentations at
regional forums comprise the majority of the documents within this study. The
speeches are primarily foreign policy speeches as they are often useful in
constructivist studies on identity. As Lisbeth Aggestam writes:
Foreign Policy speeches often reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural group that
are related to specific customs, institutions, territory, myths, and rituals. These
expressions of identity indicate how foreign-policy makers view past history, the
present, and the future political choices they face.12

These documents are collected across a range of forums-within the mentioned
time period-to include speeches and documents from APEC, ARF, ASEAN+3
conferences, bi-annual white papers, and even speeches between Chinese officials
and United Nation's leaders. Including speeches from a variety of forums is
important in order to examine a Chinese identity that is not overly influenced by the
particular setting in which any specific document is produced or presented. In other
words, the textual analysis conducted within this study seeks to reveal
commonalities and a degree of robustness in the themes across these documents.
In order to delimit my case study, the first component of my methodology is the selection of two
12

Lisbeth Aggestam, and Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price. Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the
New Agenda. London: Macmillan, 2000.
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primary shifts in China's periphery policy. The two junctures chosen were: (1) the
shift and from Chairman Mao's leftist (zuo) policy to Deng Xiaoping and Jiang
Zemin's 'Good Neighboring Policy' (mulinzhence) and adherence to the principles
of 'Peaceful Coexistence;' and (2) the shift from the Deng/Jiang era towards the
'New Security Concept' and the 'Harmonious World' vision espoused by China's
current leader Hu Jintao.
Chinese foreign policy has for decades been dictated by grand, guiding
ideologies that are often associated with the Chinese leader of the time. By analyzing
shifts from one guiding principle or ideology to another we are able to observe
internal processes of identity negotiation. At these historical junctures new leaders
are re-envisioning Chinese foreign policy while simultaneously redefining
conceptualizations of 'self vis-A-vis the 'otherYl3.These junctures at which China is
engaging in identity negotiation are also significant in that (as noted above) identity
formation is not an entirely state-owned process. Exposure and relations with an
identified 'other' are also integrated into an internal consciousness, and thus
relations between self and other become inseparable from this process of identity
negotiation. Thus if the purpose of this study is to analyze the ways in which East
Asian relations have cultivated a sense of 'regional identity' within China, these
historical junctures are sites at which external relations are influencing and
interacting with internal processes of identity formation.
While the importance and significance of these two shifts will be discussed
in later chapters, it is worth noting the reasons that justified these two specific
l3 For further investigation on the ways in which historical junctures serve as a points of contestation
and identity negotiation see: Ikenberry, John G. "Creating Yesterday's New World Order: Keynesian
"New Thinking" and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement." Idea's &Beliefs, Institutions, Foreign
and Political Change Policy. Ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane. New York: Cornell UP, 1993.

junctures as the primary focus of this study and why they are appropriate for this
study's methodological framework. First, these two shifts span across three key time
periods in modern China's foreign policy, primarily the late 1970's and early 1980's
which marked the beginning of China's market-oriented reform and opening to the
outside world (gaige kaifang) and the late 1990's going into the beginning of the
21Stcentury which was characterized by a dramatic increase in

China's relations

with its East Asian neighbors. Secondly, these particular shifts in China's foreign
policy lend themselves quite well to the investigation of key themes. These two
particular historical shifts were significant in that they took common themes such
as security and development and redefined them to align with the guiding ideology
of the time, thereby shifting identities. Thus I interweave within the larger
chronological narrative surrounding China's regional identity the themes of security
and development.
These two themes are continued throughout the proceeding chapters for
two reasons. First, the documents analyzed primarily speak to issues of Chinese and
East Asian security and economic development. This is unsurprising as issues of
security and development are top priorities of any developing country. The second
reason is theoretical in that focusing on security documents in particular allows for
an interesting exploration of identity since both security and identity are relational
concepts that, "Imply the existence of an 'other' against which the notion of a
collective self and insecurity are articulated."l4
When analyzed within a larger narrative of identity formation, these two
14

Ronnie D. Lipschutz. On Security. New York: Columbia UP, 1995:217.
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junctures (that emphasize security and development) demonstrate how China's
ideological shifts vis-A-vis its East Asian foreign policy reveal a growing regional
consciousness and a gradual internalization of a regional identity. Furthermore it
simultaneously demonstrates how China's relations with its East Asian neighbors
have played an integral role in this transformation. Where the collective 'we' was
once primarily inward-focused and unwaveringly Sino-centric, Chinese identity has
evolved to include a 'we' that has transformed 'East Asia' into 'East Asian', where a
geographical space has essentially been transformed into a concept encompassing a
collective of common interests, responsibilities, and joint development. Perhaps
even more telling is the transformation of a China that was once content to maintain
peace in order to "put order in the backyard15 and develop independently, to a
China that has assumed a more active role in sending out a call to its East Asian
neighbors that 'we are all in this together'.

Roadmap
This project is presented in 5 chapters. In chapter I, I begin with a review of
the current literature and dominant perspectives on East Asian regionalism. This
review of the literature will address current critiques of the East Asian regionalist
project, while simultaneously arguing that such critiques are based on Western,
overly substantialist standards. In the second chapter, I introduce the case of China
by discussing the current scholarship surrounding Chinese identity and its foreign

15

You Ji and Jia Qingguo, "China's Re-emergence and Its Foreign Policy Strategy," in China Review,
Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed. Chinese University Press: Hong Kong, 1998.

policy. Chapter 3 will then include a description of my relationalist model that
depicts the relational processes of regional identity formation and foreign policy
behavior. In chapter 4 I present a chronologically organized narrative that examines
key shifts in China's guiding foreign policy ideology that illustrate the applicability of
this model. By tying the two shifts discussed above, to the three stages of my
relationalist model, I attempt to show how increased and evolving relations with its
East Asian neighbors have influenced China's gradual internalization of a regional
identity. I will conclude with a discussion the implications of this relational model
and narrative on the study of East Asian regionalism and the discourse on
regionalism. Through this discussion I advance the possibility of an Asian regionalist
model and suggest that future studies on regionalism incorporate relationalist theory
into the study of regionalist dynamics.

CHAPTER I:
The 'Distinct or Deficient' Debate on East Asian Regionalism

In the following section I discuss the dominant and overly pessimistic
perspectives of scholarly works on East Asian regionalism as a political, economic,
and societal project. This review of the literature responds to current critiques and
offers an alternative analysis of East Asian regionalism that will be divided into three
sections. First I frame the current debate surrounding East Asian regionalism by
highlighting the critiques of regionalist scholars. In doing so I identify key
impediments to East Asia's regional project while addressing important
counterarguments to such criticisms. Next, drawing on 'relationalist' IR theory, I
demonstrate the need for further research on the ways in which relations have the
capacity to define an Asian Regionalism Model, prompting states to construct an
identity based on conceptualizations of a regional community.

I. Key Impediments to East Asian Regionalism

Scholars have diagnosed two primary impediments to the East Asian
regionalism project: (1) a fragmented and conflict-filled East Asian historical
narrative; and (2) the lack of a common regional identity. The following section
considers such impediments in relation to their explanatory role in the
characterization of East Asian regionalism as an agglomeration of inadequate efforts
and insurmountable obstacles. However, globalization has altered the East Asian
landscape, producing new levels of economic interdependence and political
collaboration. These current trends within East Asia challenge such critiques and

perhaps push the dominant perspective of a defunct East Asian regionalism project
into antiquity.

The Historical Narrative Impediment

Scholars such as Tobias Nischalke identify the existence of a common or
unifylng historical narrative as an integral facilitator of regionalist enterprise@. Or,
as Takashi notes, a region's history can render it hostile or welcoming to regionalist
processes17. Several reasons are given: if a region consists of states that have
consistently engaged in cooperative projects, or that have banded together to face a
common threat, they are more likely to attempt to further regionalism within the
area. Areas with histories that are filled with deep-rooted power rivalries, inwardoriented policies or little history of cooperation will be less likely to engage in the
processes of regionalismls.
Scholars point to East Asia as a historically hostile region lacking significant
progress in creating a supra-national enterprisels. The history of East Asia, spanning
from the mid-19th century and the 150 years following, has generated a state of
fragmentation due to global and regional forces of colonialism, Western influence,
and military conquests encouraged inward-oriented, nationalistic policies within the

16

Tobias Nischalke. "Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional
Community." Paczj?c Review 15 (2002): 89-117.
17
Takashi Terada. "Constructing an 'East Asian' concept and growing regional identity: from EAEC to
MEAN+3."The Pacific Review 16 (2003): 251-77.
18
Karen Wigen. "Culture, Power, and Place: The New Landscapes of East Asian
Regionalism." American Historical Review 104 (1999): 1183
19
Markus Hund, "MEANPlus Three: Towards a New Age of Pan-East Asian Regionalism? A Skeptics
Appraisal." Pacific Review 16 (2003): 383-417.

region'o. Preceding the Cold War, Asia, with the exception of Japan and Thailand,
was composed of disparate colonies under Western rule. Japan itself acted as an
imperial power during the Meiji Restoration period, and by 1864, had established an
empire that included Taiwan, Manchuria, Korea, and other parts of Northern China.
The Sino-Japanese rivalry also intensified during this period, as the first SinoJapanese war was fought in response to Japan's control of Korea, resulting in China
being forced to cede parts of Manchuria and the island of Formosa to Japan. The
second Sino-Japanese war saw the rape of Nanjing and numerous violations of state
sovereignty continued to promulgate violence well into World War IIZ1.
In the years following WWII this fragmentation continued with the new
political order brought forth by the Cold War and de-colonization. As former
colonies-from the Philippines to Indonesia-gained political independence they
concentrated their efforts on nation-building and protecting their newly acquired
sovereignty22. Whereas the European post-WWII narrative saw an increase in
attempts at European integration, East Asia found itself disengaging as newly
independent countries remained hostile towards their former regional and global
colonial masters2%In the Cold War period, the fragmentation of East Asia was
exacerbated by numerous conflicts within the region. In China, Mao's victory in 1949
incited the country's isolation vis-&-visUnited States and its Asian allies; the Great
Leap Forward from 1958-1960, the dispatching of the Red Guards in the 196oYs,the

20

For more on the history of East Asian regionalism see: T. J Pempel, Remapping East Asia The
Construction Of A Region (Cornell Studies in Political Economy). New York: Cornell UP, 2004.
21
Pempel, pg. 11
22
Pempel, pg. 9
23 John Ravenhill, "Athree bloc world? The new East Asian Regionalism." International Relations of
the Asia Paci$c 2 (2002): 167-95.

Tiananmen massacre24,and decades of internal conflicts brought forth not only
internal destabilization, but also isolated China from the East Asian region25.In
Korea, the two peninsular governments operated as hosts for the United States on
one side and the USSR on the other. Indochina was plagued by warfare at the hands
of the French and then by the Americans before falling into internal disputes.
Guerilla movements separated the Philippines, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Thailand.
In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge regime annihilated an estimated 20% of the
country's population26. In sum, 'East Asia' during this period was a conglomeration
of states united by geographical proximity but divided by warfare, external
influences, and varying stages of state development.
Literature on East Asian regionalism regards this historical context as an
underlying impediment to promoting greater cooperation as East Asian countries, it
is said, "never forget.27" This characterization is not without merit, however, as these
deep-rooted hostilities are still expressed through the ways in which individual
populations view one another. For example in the iggo's, past atrocities served as an
excuse or reason to espouse nationalistic fervor as Japanese nationalism targeted
China and North Korea, China aroused itself against Japan, and South Korea
continued to foster contempt for its former Japanese colonial masters28.Not
surprisingly, the literature suggests this historical narrative of East Asia is an

24

While the Tiananmen massacre occurs after China's isolationist period and promoted greater
economic openness, the event represents an internal conflict that deflected state attention inward in
terms of security.
25
Fu Ying, "China and Asia in new period," Foreign Affairs Journal, (Beijing), No. 69, September
2003, p. 1-7.
26 Pempel, pg. l o
27 Hund, pg. 110
28
Markus Thompson. "Whatever Happened to Asian Values?" Journal of Democracy 12 (2001): 15465.

underlying cause of strong nationalistic, inward-oriented, sovereignty-respecting
attitudes that often weaken attempts at strengthening regionalism in the area29.The
claim that regionalism in East Asia is ineffective-andslow to progress is linked to
states' unwillingness to relinquish their political sovereignty given their past
historical experiences30.
While the literature on East Asian history proves useful in explaining the
origins of East Asian political ideologies regarding sovereignty, past histories are
insufficient in predicting future behavior. Past animosities have given way gradually
to the creation of new norms and ideologies. For example, China intensified its
support for regionalist initiatives with the release of its New Security Concept,
advocating for peaceful coexistence and cooperation along its periphery31. Japan
shifted from pushing for a kyodotai (Japan dominated) community to accepting a
more equal form of regionalism with the rise of China and the collapse of its "bubble"
ec0nomy3~.Despite historical hostilities and the strong reverence for state
sovereignty, recent events have demonstrated East Asia's potential to overcome its
hostile historical past and engage in regionalist policies. Though such a narrative
may be insufficient in explaining the impediments to the project of East Asian
regionalism, it is true that past events may have impeded the creation of a regional
identity or sense of an Asian community.

The Lack of an "Asian Identity" or Community
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Asian regionalist scholars, such as Samuel Kim, have commented on the
absence of an "Asian IdentityY'33.Kim attributes this to the previously discussed
history of East Asia, arguing that consistent warfare, followed by periods of isolation
and disengagement, have hindered the formation of a united identity or the
identification of particular "Asian values." Scholars such as Gilbert Rozman suggest
that unless East Asia is able to create a shared identity, the countries within the
region will be unlikely to form a common vision as to the future of East Asia and
regionalism will remain stagnant34.
The importance of a common identity is often associated with constructivist
theories, that suggest that the composition of a nation state's "identity" often
influences its behavior towards external entitiesss. According to constructivist
literature an "identity" can include such aspects as religion, cultural and social
norms, political structures, or national and global perceptions. The problem within
East Asia, according to this criteria, is that there is little uniformity in the region
when it comes to most of these categories. Within East Asia there exist numerous
different religions or faiths, and political structures, ranging from the democratic to
the authoritarian36. Furthermore, the hotly debated issue of what countries should
be included in the region has also hindered the formation of an Asian identity. For
example, the presence of countries such as Australia or India who have strong ties to

33 Samuel S. Kim, "Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia." Journal of East Asian
Studies 4 (2004): 39.
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South East Asia have prompted debates as to whether traditionally non-East Asian
states should be included in a formal regional arrangement.
Debate over the boundaries of 'inclusion' represents more than a political
issue in which states vie to be included, instead also capturing the degree to which
states and their citizens identify with the East Asian region. Drawing boundaries
simultaneously develops a regional consciousness in which states must visualize a
geopolitical space that creates notions of 'us' and 'them' 37. Takahashi found that in
Japan and China, the two countries most poised for a leadership role in a regionalist
order, only 26 per cent and 30 percent respectively of those surveyed identified
themselves as being "Asian" when offered other choices such as European, Chinese,
Islamic, and Others*. Furthermore a study done by Tobias Nichalke examined the
impact of ASEAN operations and norms on an "MEAN" identity. His survey found
that there was little evidence to suggest a shared identity since over 60 percent of his
sample of MEAN elites state that they could "Not trust other countries in Southeast
Asia to be 'good neighbors' " and would thus continue to depend on extra-regional
entities to ensure their security39. Given the constructivist criteria, it seems that both
power rivalries, especially between China and Japan, and a general distrust of other
countries within the region have impeded the creation of an "Asian Identity".
While there is evidence to suggest the lack of a common "Asian Identity" or
"Asian Values" according to constructivist standards, it is possible that these
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assertions are based on a substantialist and essentially Western notion of what
comprises a 'common identity'40. While many scholars cite homogenous political
structures in Europe as a facilitating factor in the success of the EU, the idea that
uniform government structures indicate a shared identity is based on the primacy
that Western states accord to legal processes and institutions. As will be discussed
later, this also highlights that the discourse on regionalism focuses on material
entities such as institutions, viewing them as primary observable manifestations of a
regionalist project. This is shown in the manner in which East Asian institutions
such as the ASEAN Plus Three have come under attack, with many scholars
attributing its weaknesses to the differing political and economic structures within
the region41. Furthermore, there appears to be a growing pattern in the literature of
emphasizing common institutional, political, and economic structures as the main
impetus for a shared identity42. Such an emphasis is once again influenced by EU
standards, where member states were mainly liberal democracies and possessed
similar economic structures at the time of integration.
Though East Asia may be politically heterogeneous, there is evidence,
according to Singaporean academic, Simon Tay, a significant amount of crosscultural exchange between the countries of East Asia43. Cultural phenomena such as
'J-Pop', Chinese films, and Korean Soap Operas are spreading at an extraordinary
rate and have served as an effective means to connect the people of various East
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Asian countries44. Indeed Tay suggests that the growing common regional identity
need not be found in institutions; it can also be found, "In the streets of Shanghai,
Shibuya in Tokyo, and Singapore," thus constituting a bottom-up formation of an
Asian identity45. Thus scholars such as Mitchell Bernard and John Ravenhill are
correct when they assert that East Asian regionalism is more than just economic
cooperation and 'product cycles'46. Economic cooperation not only leads to an
increase in the exchange of goods between states, but also to an increase in crosscultural exposure. This provides individuals with a means to connect with their East
Asian neighbors and may contribute to a growing 'Asian Culture' that might serve as
the basis for regionalism.
Or East Asian countries might form a top-down regional identity that is based
on shared responses to processes of modernization such as globalization. Instead of
an identity based on past historical experiences, common internal structures, or
norms and ideologies, an East Asian vision might be shaped by the contemporary
historical juncture, a specific point in a historical timeline that can promote
cooperation between countries47. This observation is not without historical merit.
While some scholars suggest that it was a common "European Identity" that helped
to form the EU, clearly it was also in large part a response to the position that
European countries found themselves in after WWII. Similarly, the idea of
regionalism gained momentum in East Asia after the Asian Financial Crises in 199748.
44
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In these cases, it was a particular historical juncture that encouraged states to work
with one another. Thus countries within East Asia might forge a common identity
based on the common challenges that they face.
It is difficult to deny East Asia's turbulent history and tenuous regional
identity. However, the effects that such impediments have had on the East Asian
regionalist project have been overstated, ignoring the evolving and increasingly
interconnected landscape brought forth by globalization.

II. Solingen on the Flaws of East Asian Regionalism

Despite the perceived absence of an Asian identity or a historical narrative
that promotes cooperation, East Asian states have engaged in numerous regionalism
efforts. However, these efforts have been criticized as flawed and inefficient. Just as
the identified impediments to further regionalism are overstated by the literature,
the flaws identified in existing institutions by authors such as Etel Solingen are also
based on Western standards that hold institutionalization and legal rule-based
Weberian states as the modus operandi49. In her work, Solingen describes two
prominent and frequently articulated defects of East Asian institutions: informality
and consensus-based procedures.

Informality and the Institutional Dilemma
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Solingenysfirst critique holds that East Asian institutions emphasize process
over progress, relying on personal relations, open dialogue, and "soft" power
diplomacy instead of established, bureaucratic, rule-based institution. According to
Solingen and other skeptics of East Asian regionalism, this informal setting allows
for states to refuse to raise contentious issues, avoiding confrontation at the cost of
producing any substantive agreements. The result is general codes of conduct and
principles rather than concrete and specific initiatives to enforce regional polices.
This informality is also present within the structural framework of ASEAN itself for
example. Critics claim that ASELAN'S small secretariat is nothing more than a
coordinating mechanism among national secretariats void of any real formal
authority or a power to seriously influence state agendasso.
Scholars similarly claim that the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
is inefficient due to its structural informality. The APEC began as an informal
dialogue but has evolved into a regional institution promoting economic cooperation
and free trade agreements. APEC is not modeled after such formal agreements as the
U.S-Canadian agreement however; it has no coercive enforcement mechanisms and
instead relies on voluntary commitmentsl. Furthermore, like ASEAN, APEC also
possesses a small and limited secretariat whose job is to provide an advisory,
technical and operational role rather than one of strong leadership. According to
Solingen, " Many consider it too weak to support a more dynamic agenda, even one
not focused on trade liberalization...but political operation52."
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The informality of East Asian institutions is not surprising due to the
commitment to principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in the region.
This commitment is exemplified in the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) agreement, the
most significant attempt by East Asian countries to create a regional order. The
informal mechanisms within the APT have been referred to as the "ASEAN way,"
emphasizing accommodation, consultation, reciprocity, and informal diplomacy53.
Due to the primacy of national secretariats over the ASEAN secretariat, scholars
often criticize ASEAN for its lack of enforcement mechanisms and the absence of any
sort of binding or precise legal obligations. This was further shown when the APT
created an East Asian Vision Group to deliberate on the goals of East Asian
cooperation and an institutional framework. While the report outlined over seventy
proposals to address concerns such as regional poverty and to create a regional
identity, it failed to mention the creation of any form of supra-national institution
and thus failed to establish anything more than a rhetorical commitment. As John
Ravenhill writes, "significant change or any form of collective trust between states is
rendered impossible when states are free to renounce their obligations54. Thus most
scholars hold that if regionalism is to succeed in East Asia, countries must be willing
to move past dialogue and begin to institutionalize specific and binding rules upon
its member states.
Much of the literature concurs that attempts at regionalism, primarily in the
form of APT, have been stagnant or ineffective due to this lack of institutionalization.
This assertion implies that a successful regionalism model must emulate the
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"adversarial posturing, majority vote, and other legalistic procedures in Western
multilateral organizations.55'' It seems doubtful that this model can be applied in
East Asian states whose strong emphasis on state sovereignty would discourage them
from taking part in an organization based on confrontational and legally
constraining principles.
Viewed more positively, however, the informality of APT processes allows for
greater flexibility in dealing promptly with pressing issues that a highly bureaucratic
organization would be unable to address. Furthermore, because the APT relies on
extensive dialogue, holding over 700 meetings a year, East Asian regionalism is
enshrined in a commitment towards the settlement of disputes through peaceful
means, establishing confidence within states that their sovereignty is unthreatened
and consequently forming a sense of community56. Since its creation, no ASEAN
member has been involved in a major armed confrontation with another member
state, which further attests to its dedication to peaceful resolution57. By allowing
states to engage in an n-xprocedure-allowing them to choose what commitments
they are to engage in-APT also has rendered cooperation that would otherwise be
non-existent, possible. For example, had strong enforcement mechanisms and
sovereignty encroaching policies been present in the APT, countries such as China
would have been less likely to engage with the institution or agree to trade
agreements with ASEAN58.

55 Amitav Acharya. "China's Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia," International Herald Tribune,
November 8-9,2003.
56 Stubbs, pg. 442
57
Dent, pg. 30.
58 Bernard and Ravenhill, pg. 180

Consensual, Fragmented and Indecisive Policies

Critics also claim that the informal and passive nature of these institutions not
only creates weak and essentially unenforceable agreements, but also prevent these
organizations from setting a more relevant regional political agenda. More
specifically scholars have pointed to consent-oriented decision-making procedures
that often fail to create any multi-lateral or decisive policies59. This is evident in the
large number of bilateral and preferential trade agreements (PTA) in comparison to
an extremely limited number of significant multi-lateral agreements in the region.
In fact, attempts at creating multi-lateral agreements such as an Asian Monetary
Union or currency exchange program have failed in the region for the most part due
to the objection of member countries such as China. As a result East Asian countries
not only prefer to engage in bilateral agreements with neighboring countries but
extra-regional states as we1160. Scholars claim that regional agreements are therefore
extremely fragmented, resembling a 'hub and spoke- model' or creating an over all
"noodle bowl" effect-a collection of disparate bilateral agreements with no multilateral linkages61.
Due to this observation, many scholars within the field of economics
recommend that East Asian countries expand their existing bilateral agreements into
larger multi-lateral arrangements in order to pressure otherwise unwilling states to
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engage in regional cooperation62. This suggestion closely resembles the notion of the
"domino effect," a theory proposed by Western scholars that was used to describe
how the European Union was able to grow from a smaller economic cooperation
agreement inevitably encouraging other countries to follow suit eventually in a large
scale regional cooperative enterprise% While this model is based on Western rather
than Asian constructs, scholars believe that it would allow East Asian countries to
build upon their numerous bi-lateral agreements and establish a foundation for the
creation of an integrated and multi-inclusive regional arrangement.

III. From "Noodle Bowl" t o Regionalism Network

Many authors conclude that the chances of a successful multi-lateral
economic or security-oriented agreement are quite 10~64.With this conclusion the
question becomes: will East Asian policies then remain stagnant in the disoriented
"noodle bowl" model? While many authors have dismissed the possible effectiveness
of the existing economic and political agreements between the APT countries, it is in
large part due to the perception that multi-lateral arrangements are uniquely more
effective in promoting regional cooperation. However, it may be the case that
bilateral agreements within East Asia have the potential to facilitate regionalism in
the area due to the indirect networks that they create. While there exists no
significant multi-lateral trade or security arrangements, almost every country within
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East Asia shares trade partners with other member countries and are thus
inadvertently connected. The informal network formed by the presence of numeral
bilateral and mini-lateral agreements can deter conflict among all participating
countries. Country x need not have a direct alliance with Country y for in such a
network both countries inevitably share alliances with other powers within the
network. This may deter either from pursuing aggressive policies towards the other,
due to the risk of harming other alliances.
Another possibility lies within the current 'hub and spoke' model. This model
can be improved if the APT secretariat plays the role of the hub, meaning that while
states can still engage in bilateral agreements, they can use APT to monitor and
regulate these arrangements; in this way states can essentially 'defer' enforcement
procedures, which could lead to conflict, to a third party. The APT'S importance
would not be as an institution determining the direction and agenda by which East
Asian regionalism should develop. Rather the actual relations and agreements
between states would define the regionalist project, with the APT serving as a conflict
mitigator as well as a connecting point to promote a greater sense of security6%

N. Impediments to East Asian Regionalism: A Discursive Problem?

The literature on East Asian regionalism suggests that regionalism efforts
within the area have been ineffective and stagnant due to its emphasis on dialogue
over coercion, soft power over hard power, and 'process' over 'progress.' According
to this argument, East Asia suffers from a history that hinders rather than promotes
65 Christopher M.
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cooperation. In addition, the region lacks a common identity, preventing individual
countries from uniting in a shared vision of the future. Due to these impediments,
Etel Solingen has laid out the main flaws of current East Asian regional institutions,
highlighting their informality and unenforceable nature. Thus critics of East Asian
regionalism view the policies and agreements set forth by the institutions such as
APT or APEC as lacking any real authority.
However, these characterizations are based on Western standards-usually
drawing on the EU model-that may be unsuitable for the cultural, political, and
economic conditions in the East Asian region-a region whose identity will not be
shaped by the presence of homogenous political or economic structures but by
regional exchanges. Furthermore, historical juncture analysis shows that East Asia
may unite in a common vision not in response to shared beliefs or the presence of
"Asian Values," but in a response to modernity and a globalist political narrative
largely controlled by the West. Finally, applying new perspectives on the
configurations of regional identities that include cross-cultural interaction
potentially shifts our vision to a more contemporary narrative that acknowledges
regionally sensitive responses to worldwide trends such as globalization. Western
regionalism models ignore such possibilities that could produce a more optimistic
view on East Asian regionalism, due to its emphasis on institutional efficacy and
policy enforcement. When one abandons the Western regionalism model, it is
possible to see that current initiatives undertaken by APT members may indicate the
formation of a distinctive, rather than deficient integrative model; a non-Eurocentric
model that focuses on diplomacy, negotiation, and emphasizes peaceful resolution
techniques.

Perhaps one of the most significant explanations for the critiques of East
Asian regionalism lies not within the actions of states themselves. Perhaps it instead
lies in a predilection within the discourse on regionalism to focus on substantialist
material 'entities' (particularly regional institutions) rather than on the (relationalist)
networks of relations that define the East Asian regionalist project. As previously
discussed, Western models often define a successful regionalist project as an
arrangement in which individual states cede (at least partially) certain aspects of
their sovereignty in order to form a regional enterprise which has the power to
advance a collective agenda and promote regional security and prosperity.
Thus the scholarship on East Asian regionalism has been largely shaped by
substantialist analysis. Samuel Kim defines regionalism as 'the actions undertaken
by states to promote regional cooperation and to attain regional goals'. This suggests
that regionalism is a byproduct of the state, and that it is the action of states that
creates regionalism. In treating regionalism as a process owned by states, scholars
tend to view the relations between states as controlled mechanisms by which states
are changing the relations not vice versa. This is exemplified by the usual
implementation of network theory in the study of East Asian regionalism. East Asia
is treated as a composition of various networks, with various nodes representing
states and regional institutions. However such theory tends to focus primarily on the
nodes (or actors) within networks, often treating the ties between such nodes as
static 'things' like the 'ties' existing between concrete physical entities66.
Contrary to substantialist analysis, these ties or networks are not static but
fluid and dynamic. During interaction it is not the physical configurations of states
66
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that change but rather their norms, preferences, and identities. This suggests that
such norms and preferences are not 'possessed' by stateslnodes themselves but are
rather embedded within ties and relations in which states participate. Thus the
formation of norms and preferences can exist as an un-owned process, consistently
evolving with continuous interactions and influencing and transforming the states
themselves. This suggests that we can no longer simply view regionalism as an
owned process that is in the complete control of states. Rather it is a series of
relations organized into a network of nodes and ties, where the ties between entities
are constantly changing and in-turn shaping the state nodes themselves.
Critics of East Asian regionalism, like Kim, often argue that regionalism has
failed due in large to the lack of a pre-existing collective identity. However the very
conception of identity has been largely substantialist and studies have not focused on
the relational processes that compose identity. Scholars writing on regional identity
within the region generally focus on factors endogenous to states themselves or the
regional institutions in which they operate. For example, in his attempt to examine
the construction of an 'East Asian' concept and growing regional identity, Takashi
Terada studies the ways in which individual state identities impeded the success of
such organizations. However, he neglected to examine the ways in which the
individual identities were in a dialogical transaction with other actors and
institutions, and the ways in which such relations affected not only the institutions,
but were actually shaping the very identities of the states themselves.
The IR literature on identity commonly treats identity as an owned
characteristic from which relations are then affected. In other words, states are
possessors of identity, and they in fact shape their identity by attributing

characteristics to themselves in relation 'to7rather than 'with7the other. Alexander
Wendt describes the ways in which two forms of identity, corporate and social are
formed, arguing that corporate identity depends on how the state defines itself in
relation to the other, which is connected to social identities which are sets of
meanings that an actors attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others,
that is, as a social object67. However in describing identity formation in this way,
identity becomes a controlled process, one that is changed as perceptions by the state
changes. This undermines the processes in which identities are created not only in
opposition to one another in an identity-alterity nexus but are dialogically linked to
relations with other actors.
In studying regional identity within East Asia, analyzing and observing the
actions undertaken by states and regional institutions is inadequate if scholars are to
understand the underlying processes that are changing identities. Interpreting the
actions and statements of entities as representations of a preexisting identity may no
longer be sufficient in that processes, rather than observable actions, reveal the ways
in which state identities are changing or moving towards a regional collective
identity. Despite the fact that the policies and actions of East Asian states v i s - h i s
regional institutions such as APT or the EAEC may be interpreted to represent a lack
of commitment towards regionalism, the relations between such organizations and
entities may suggest that state perceptions of 'self and 'other7are changing and
moving towards a more cooperative rather than oppositional configuration. In other
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words, relations between East Asian countries are shaping state identities by
influencing states to see themselves as part of a cooperative enterprise, rather than
as a fragmented collection of states in realist state of anarchy.
The above section has attempted to show that the East Asian regionalist
project has in large part been deemed a failure due to a substantialist lens that has
dominated the discourse on regionalism. Defining a 'successful' regionalist project in
substantialist terms has placed the EU model at the apex of regionalist endeavors,
overemphasizing the importance of institutional capacity and formal procedures and
agreements. Applying a relationalist lens in analyzing East Asian regionalism
suggests that there are other measures of 'success': if regional relations can cultivate
a sense of a 'regional identity' within member states that encourages each member
state to engage in greater collaboration, cooperation and coordination with its East
Asian neighbors, then it does not matter as much whether such relations occur
formally or informally, or in or outside an institutional arena. In this way, the East
Asian regionalist project can be perceived not as a failed endeavor, but rather as a
non-Eurocentric, pioneering regionalism model.
As discussed earlier, in order to observe these regional relations and their
influence on 'regional identity' and regional foreign policy I will be using China as a
case study. In doing so I offer an alternative analysis to expand the East Asian
regionalism literature by elucidating the ways in which East Asian relations create a
sense of regional identification. The next section will demonstrate that such a study
is needed since scholarship on Chinese identity vis-8-vis foreign policy has focused
on essentially 'labeling' China according to constructivist-realist or liberal
perceptions.

CHAPTER2:
'Naming' The Dragon: The Debate Surrounding Chinese Identity

China presents itself as an ideal case study of the ways in which regional
relations create, direct, and reinforce processes of self-identity formation. As Emilian
Kavalski states, China's regionalist project reveals "a world of relational process, a
world which much must be studied in relational terms.68'' David Kang goes further,
arguing that China's future and the impacts on those within its spheres of influence
depend not on power politics, but instead arises from a deeper concern with national
identity and its relation to foreign policy behavior@.
In regards to foreign policy and East Asian regionalism, the literature
surrounding Chinese identity has largely focused on answering three questions.
First, what defines and determines China's identity? Second, in relating Chinese
identity to a contemporary context, is the state of China's identity stable and fixed or
in a period of transition and transformation? Finally, how does China's selfidentification affect its East Asian foreign policy initiatives? In answering these
questions, the literature-while generally constructivist-displays a strong
bifurcation along realist-leaning and liberalist interpretations of Chinese identity.
While constructivist-realist theory claims that China sees itself as a 'Rising Great
Power' poised for hegemonic rule, Neoliberal theory views China imagining itself as a
'Good Neighbor' striving for stability and peace.
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I. Fixing Chinese Identity?: Rising Power'or 'Good Neighbor'

In answering the first question, some constructivist theory has identified
China's self-identification as a 'Rising Great Power', emphasizing China's belief in
Realpolitik power dynamics, China's historical narrative of return to greatness, and
its growing influence in the world economy. Scholars such as Maria Hsia Chang
center the discussion of Chinese identity around the idea of a long-held
'victimization mentality' (shouhaizhe xintai): China's 150 years of humiliation at the
hands of Western powers challenged the long-held Middle Kingdom ideology which
placed China at the center and apex of the universe70. More importantly, in line with
Kenneth Waltz's seminal work on political realism, events such as the Opium War
demonstrated to China the importance of power and security in defending China's
autonomy and sovereignty71. In this context China constructs its ultimate goal as
reestablishing and redefining itself as the world's Great Power.
This desire to regain Great Power status has in turn fostered a Chinese
identity grounded in a realist paradigm in which Chinese perceptions of 'self and
'other' are construed using a Western power as the primary frame of reference.
According to Ni Feng, China has long viewed itself as a victim of a uni-polar political
structure dominated by the West, finding itself placed at the outskirts of the
international system and condemned to its Asian periphev*. Supporting this view,
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American scholars have assigned China "an outlier status outside the peaceful Great
Power group," which is defined by a "shared in-group identity."73 According to Deng,
China's out-group identification has fueled its desire to identify itself as a nonWestern power that is capable of accumulating enough status and power to protect
its sovereignty.
In addition, China's integration into the world economy and its rapid
economic growth has also prompted it to self-identify as a rising power, fighting for
membership within the Great Power elite. In a nationwide survey conducted in 1995,
the popular newspaper China Youth Daily asked its young readers to comment on
how they viewed themselves relative to the rest of the world. Most recognized
China's 'economic backwardness' as the main detriment in its ability to compete for
great power status in the international arena. Today, China's average GDP growth
ranges from 7 to 10% annually, while most of the Western world, including the
United States, has experienced growth barely reaching 3%.Foreign capital is steadily
flowing into Chinese markets while the rest of the world attempts to launch massive
macroeconomic policies to encourage investment. As a result, China's growing
economic influence has increased its confidence in identifying as a rising world
power to such an extent that scholars such as Kang argue that the very legitimacy of
the CCP depends on its ability to maintain China's economic growth relative to the
rest of the world.
In summary, according to the constructivist-realist framework, China's
historical narrative of victimization and a reevaluation of its current economic and
73
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political capabilities has generated a national identity defined by its pragmatic desire
to attain Great Power status.
While the Realist-influenced conception of Chinese identity emphasizes a
western-centric system of anarchy, victimization, and a fundamental desire to
accumulate power, other constructivists, such as David Kang contend that China has
instead identified itself as a liberal 'Good Neighbor' (mulin youhao). According to
Kang the construction of Chinese identity involves more than traditional power
politics and when analyzing Chinese foreign policy, it is necessary to consider more
than the material logic of interstate Realpolitik. What is needed instead is an
examination of processes of self-identification, social identity, and self-image not in
isolation, but in interaction with informal and formal linkages between exogenous
relations and endogenous factors. Instead of victimization, 'Good Neighbor' China
emphasizes obligation, where the PRC must not seek to expand its power but rather
to use its influence to promote a cooperative and peaceful coexistence. As scholars
such as Barme articulates, 'Good Neighbor' China attempts to "make friends in every
quarter, trade goods, learn from each other and enjoy respectful interaction, (guang

jiao pengyou, hutong youwu, bici xuexi, li shang wanglai).74"
Diverging from frameworks centered on the West as other, constructivistliberals contend that this Western-oriented identity cannot be used to describe the
ways in which China and East Asia in particular interact75. Instead of feeling
'condemned' to its periphery, China has embraced its East Asian neighbors
advocating for multi-lateral, cooperation across the region. Instead of seeking to
-
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accumulate power and exert its influence, the PRC has attempted to strengthen
relations and restrain any perceptions of itself as a hegemon within the region. In
other words China has attempted to define itself in relation to East Asia,
internalizing an in-group identity as a stabilizer and responsible member of the East
Asian community. In this respect, the construction of Chinese identity vis-a-vis its
foreign policy is more than a quest towards the upper echelons of international
status, but rather a quest towards "identification" (rentong)with and "fusion"

(rongru)into the regional community76.
It is worth noting that other scholars have attempted to fuse constructivistrealist and constructivist-liberal interpretations of Chinese identity. This fusion of
ideas contends that China has neither constructed an identity that can be solely
defined as that of a 'Great Power' or a 'Good Neighbor'. Instead, both realist and

neoliberalist-constructivist ideas have manifested themselves in a Chinese identity
built upon the notion of a 'Responsible Power', where China is attempting to
socialize peacefully as a new power into an existing regional order77. Accordingly,
while China does not necessarily desire to establish itself as a regional hegemon that

determines and controls the regional order, the PRC still desires to work with its
East Asian neighbors in creating a peaceful and cooperative community in which it
can assume a leadership role. In this way such scholars have attempted to emphasize
the realist-neoliberalist overlap between "two distinct systems of rule, two different
ways of conceiving power, two sets of practices-which may be distinguished, not
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only analytically, but also normatively," and most importantly, "two different ways of
imagining space.78"

The Pursuit of Chinese Identity: Stasis vs. Transformation

The second question that scholars on Chinese identity have sought to answer
considers the fixed or variable nature of a guiding, national identity. To put it
differently, has China already determined and internalized an observable and fixed
identity that may explain its foreign policy behavior? Or is the PRC still in a period of
active pursuit of a sense of identity, wherein Chinese self-identification is in a fluid
and dynamic process of transition and transformation? Such questions are
imperative in analyzing the process of identity formation. If China's identity is
presupposed and fixed then the self-identification process lacks an evolving temporal
dimension in that identity is already endogenously determined. On the other hand,
assuming variability in China's self-identification allows for the possibility of a
temporal process in which both endogenous and exogenous factors are interacting to
shape Chinese identity.
Scholars such as Yan Xuetong argue that China's identity is not about
transformation, or realization, but rather of revitalization79. Accordingly, China's
identity resembles not that of a quest but has already been determined and
conditioned by an ideology placing China at the center of the international arena.
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Stutter reiterates this point, arguing that China has always identified itself as the
central player within the East Asian arena. However, given its experiences with
Western hegemony during the Opium War and later through U.S hegemony within
the East Asian region, China has since been unable to reawaken its identity as a
Great Power. As the following commentary by a close associate of former PRC
President Jiang Zemin suggests, China's current political and economic position has
since allowed for a revival of the 'sleeping dragon'so:
A rising China will never be a nation that is satisfied with only food and shelter.
Her development and progress will definitely make contributions to peace and
prosperity of the world. China was such a [nation] in the past for several
thousands of years, it will definitely become such a nation again in the next
millennium ...our nation used to be a crucial player on the playground of
international politics. [Its] enhancing economic capabilities, and its status of
being a major nuclear power and a permanent member on the UN Security
Council, will give our nation a larger and larger role in world affairs. Our
nation enjoys a position as an irreplaceable major world power (Jieming 1997).

This statement conveys a finality of China's perception of itself, as China
appears resolute in its belief that it is an "irreplaceable" world power. Deng Yong
echoes this point when he suggests that China has concluded its self-identification
process and is currently attempting 'live up to' its role as a rising, responsible power.
In other words, China's identity has long been fixed and conditioned by its
nationalist sentiments and feelings of entitlement to be recognized as a global center
of power: their quest is not in search for something new or an 'identity' but rather to
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regain the international status that they had lost. As Joseph Nye writes, China's 'rise'
is really the product of a misidentification of its return to powergl.
However, other scholars such as Kang argue that characterizing China's
identity as preconditioned and essentially static ignores current exogenous relations
and factors that are in a continuous interplay with China's endogenous identity
construction mechanisms. In addressing China's identity Kang states that the
globalized nature of economics and culture has made China's self-identification
processes "subject to a number of influential dynamics" and there is no immutable
"Chinese mind-set.82" In other words, any attempts to elucidate the construction of
China's identity must resist characterizing such processes as a quest to regain a past
great power status or produce a given sense of identity. Rather it is an ongoing and
fluid journey of adaptation versus atrophy.
More importantly, Kang has opened the door for new views on Chinese
identity that recognize the importance of internally determined endogenous factors
while simultaneously acknowledging that the construction of China's identity is not
entirely an internally owned process. Rather, it is a process in which identity is
constructed on more than a Realpolitik vision: a constant state of transition as the
world system and the relations that comprise it are directly and indirectly exerting
their influence on China's self-conceptualization.

Chinese Identity and its Implications for the East Asian Regional Order
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Finally, in answering the third question regarding Chinese identity vis-A-vis
East Asian foreign policy, the literature appears to accept the theory of the politics of
identity. This view acknowledges that national identity includes a " particular set of
ideas about political community that policy-makers use and draw on to mobilize a
sense of cohesion," which shapes its foreign policy behavio~-83.For example,
proponents of the 'China Threat' theory, such as Bernstein and Monro, assert that
China is the sole threat to US security as its identification as a great power has led
the PRC to project its economic and political influence until it gains a seat on the 'ingroup superpower table'g4. Other scholars such as Kurlantzick claims China's
identity as a 'Rising Great Power' by leads it to direct its soft-power policies towards
Southeast Asia, characterizing China's relations with SEA as a 'charm offensiveY85.As
part of this 'charm offensive', Chinese identity has generated internally constructed
feelings of entitlement as the region's leader. In this way, China's identity is
presupposed and used as a fixed variable to explain its foreign policy behavior. As
previous critiques outlined above have shown, China's identity is continuously being
influenced by a vast network of relations and thus scholars would be mistaken to
ignore the reality that China is being influenced by its neighbors through the same
temporal process in which it is exerting its own influence.
While it is tempting to argue that China exhibits certain behaviors because it
has-internalized a particular identity that necessitates such behavior, such an
83
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analysis oversimplifies the relations that exist from the beginning stages of identity
formation to a realized foreign policy agenda. By automatically assuming a given
identity that is utilized to comprehend and explain China's foreign policy, this view
ignores the process of identity formation that is inextricably embedded within a
temporal process in which foreign policy only serves as an observable proxy for the
relations that underpin Chinese identity.
Thus the literature has little consensus. The realist-constructivist framework
over-emphasizes endogenous factors comprising national identity; when referring to
external relations, this view focuses mainly on the West or an abstract notion of the
'international community' while under utilizing China's East Asian periphery as a
frame of reference. In contrast, the liberal-constructivist interpretation of identity
centers primarily on the importance of relational processes in shaping identity but
neglects to elucidate a temporal process to conceptualize the interaction between
relations and identity construction mechanisms. China's foreign policy may be less a
product of a specific identity and more a result of a temporal sequence comprised of
relations and feedback loops, self-perception and contextualization, and processes of
reinforcement. In order to illuminate this temporal sequence, the following chapter
will articulate a relationalist model that isolates particular stages of this proccessual
narrative.

Chapter 3:
A Relationalist Model for a Regionalist Process

The study of International Relations is generally dominated by a substantialist
vernacular and thus it becomes exceedingly difficult to avoid reified notions of
'states' or 'institutions'. It is important that such entities not be treated as actors
solely on the assumption that they are the ontological primitives of analysis.
Relationalism argues that relations shape conceptions of identities that in turn
generate particular norms and preferences. The same way in which Foucault argues
that states do not own power but that power is made up of a series of relations that in
turn help to form states, relational theories argue that identity, norms, and
preferences are also made up of series of relations that shape the composition and
principles of the state project. Relationalists argue, then, that interactions exist
logically or analytically prior to entities and can in fact create and transform the
entities themselves86.
Applying a relationalist lens that regards entities as observable proxies for
relational interaction helps to illuminate a process in which such relations create a
sense of regional consciousness, identity, and policy. Such a relationalist model,
while still cognizant of the usefulness of notions of the 'state' and 'state behavior',
highlights the ways in which an actor, operating as a series of previous relations,
perceives and distinguishes between exogenous and endogenous influences. These

As Charles Tilly's work on state formation suggests, states are merely configurations of relations of
capital and coercionp6(Tilly 1975).
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perceived differences between exogenous and endogenous influences then generate a
sequence of stages in which these influences are in consistent interplay.
In previous chapters, I argued that the formation and internalization of a
'regional identity' follows a temporal process that redefines notions of 'state',
'identity', and 'foreign policy' as social manifestations or projections of a series of
relations. My conception of this process builds upon Jackson and Nexon's concepts
of yoking and ownership and should be modeled as a temporal sequence that
explains how Chinese identity is created, internalized, and projected.
In this chapter I articulate a relational model to elucidate processes of identity
negotiation. This model (see figure 1) depicts the formation and internalization of a
regional identity through three stages: Stage 1, draws upon the China's reformist
movement at the end of the Qing Dynasty to demonstrate the initial stage of
contextualization and re-evaluation. During this initial stage, external cues or events
initiate a rethinking of the 'self within a current environment or context. The result
is a developed 'frame of reference' or perceived 'other' by which the 'self is to be
compared. Stage 2 takes the example of the Reformist movement a step further,
demonstrating how relations generate interplay between endogenous and exogenous
influences that can then produce a regional identity. This regional identity then
generates particular interests, goals, according to a particular role conception.
Finally stage 3, demonstrates an internalization of a regional identity as a merging of
'self and 'other'. This internalization then produces certain policy behavior that can
be observed in changes in policy or ideological shifts.

Figure 1.1- A Relationalist Model of a Regionalist Process
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Stage I : Contextualization and Reevaluation
The first stage, as displayed infigure 1.1 a, involves a process of
contextualization in which an actor assumes a receiver role and attempts to gather
signals from its environment in order to determine its own position vis-i-vis other
actors within the given subsystem87. Borrowing from Ashis Nandy's concept of
'consciousness', the primary stage of this relationalist model involves the creation of
a contextualized regional consciousness, a sense of 'self based on current
observations of an endogenously-determined 'other'that exists due to a recognition
of the 'self as a part of a larger organizational systemgg.
The stimulus behind this stage and model can range from a particular event,
with enough significance that it necessitates a reevaluation of an actor's environment,
to paradigmatical shifts that transform the political, economic, and social narrative
in which actors find themselves deeply embedded. There is no identifiable
'beginning' to this stage, however, as actors at any given time are social embodiments
of prior relational processes. Rather actors at any given point in time may be induced
into this process of contextualization; since there are no predetermined timeduration conditions, this process is particular to the actor and circumstance.
Characterizing historical events or shifts in paradigms as potential stimuli helps to
avoid the objectification of particular events or historical junctures. Rather than
substantiating or simplifying these occurrences as 'causes' of certain phenomena, a
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relationalist model emphasizes their role as initial stimuli to a larger sequence of
relational processes that generates observable phenomena.
A primary example within the East Asian regionalism literature is the

movement towards a more integrated economic regional order that emphasized
cooperation and coordination between countries. Many scholars, such as David
Marshall, are tempted to explain such as phenomena as a result of the East Asian
financial crisis which caused countries to reevaluate their economic policies89. In this
way, the East Asian financial crisis is substantiated as a 'cause' rather than a
stimulus that provided the impetus to a larger, more dynamic sequence of relations.
For example, as mentioned earlier, Southeast Asian countries that have long
histories as victims of colonization have aggressively protected the principles of state
sovereignty. Thus, the East Asian crisis did not directly cause countries to reevaluate
their economic policies. Rather, the crisis indirectly stimulated a rethinking of policy
by first initiating a process in which Southeast Asian countries grappled with their
identities as sovereign countries who had gained freedom from colonial rule and
their current role as a members of a closely connected regional system. This is not to
say that regionalist scholars have ignored completely the importance of the relations
that occurred between East Asian countries due to the crisis, but rather that
relational processes and potential models in which these processes are organized
have not been explored in depth by the literature as seen in chapter I.
Relying on particular occurrences or events to explain current structures or
narratives also renders the literature susceptible to overemphasizing prodigious
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events and underemphasizing more nuanced or hard to observe processes in which
gradual and evolving relations play a primary role. For example, the Chinese
Reformist and Self-strengthening movement during the late Qing dynasty tends to
be viewed as a struggle between modern intellectuals and an antiquated ruling
government. Scholars point to the role that the movement played in setting the stage
for collapse of the Qing dynasty and the founding of a Chinese Republic. However,
the movement was really a manifestation of relations between the 'self and 'other', a
process of contextualization in which Chinese intellectuals developed a global
consciousness that allowed them to see the backwardness of the Chinese state
relative to the affluence of its Japanese and Western counterparts. Political thinkers
such as Kang Youwei and his disciple Liang Qichao engaged in numerous studies
abroad and in doing so were influenced by the remarkable growth and wealth
experienced by other countries while watching as famine and corruption ran
throughout the dynasty.
Thus simplifying the Self-strengthening movement as a 'cause' for the demise
of the Qing dynasty underemphasizes its role as an embodiment of relations that
occurred between Chinese intellectuals and the outside world. This relationship
between intellectuals and their external environment signaled China's
'backwardness' and engendered a reevaluation and re-contextualization of China visA-vis the Western world. Furthermore, this preoccupation of using the West as
comparison marks the creation of a 'frame of reference' in which the West became an
unavoidable 'other'.

Stage 2: The Formation of a 'Regional Identity'

The second stage, as shown infigure i.i.b, represents an interplay between
endogenous and exogenous influences in which a sense of regional identity is formed
and obligations and interests in relation to such an identity are generated. It is
important to note that what counts as 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' are determined
internally by what is perceived to be the 'self and 'other' at a particular point in time.
It is critical to the model that such conceptions of endogenous and exogenous remain
variable rather than fixed, emphasizing a dynamic rather than static process of
engagement. Stated more simply, what was considered to be 'traditionally Chinese'
during certain periods in Chinese history could be quite different from what is
considered traditionally Chinese today.
In referring back to the Self-strengthening movement, we begin to see how
variables considered to be 'endogenous' to the 'self during the late Qing dynasty
were in constant relational-interaction with external influences generating a sense of
regional identity. The political thinking of Kang Youwei is a personification of lager
processes that were underway during late Qing dynasty leading up to the May 4th
movementgo. Leading up the movement, traditional Confucian ideology
characterized traditional Chinese thought, providing the ethical direction and
justification for various aspects of society. Kang was in many ways a traditional
Chinese scholar who was well versed in the Confucian classics. His time abroad in
Japan brought forth a realization that if China was to attain the same levels of
economic growth and affluence, China would need to break free of antiquity and
Kang Youwei is regarded as the father of the Self-strengthening Reformist movement. His political thinking
also had a significant impact on future leaders, such as Mao Zedong, who often required his commanders to
read Youwei's seminal work the Datongshu (hR*),
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embrace modernity. A universalist and Utopian, Kang Youwei sought to bring about
reform through a complete rethinking of society in its entirety, necessitating a
reevaluation and reconciliation of Confucian ideology with the needs of the Chinese
people in modern times. However Youwei did not attempt to replace what he and
other intellectuals perceived to be traditionally Chinese (Confucian guiding
principles) with Western ideas. Instead he intended to expand the dao (.@, the
Confucian Way, so that Western ideas and techniques could develop not so much
alongside Confucian ideology, but within Confucianism itself. In this way Kang
Youwei's thinking perfectly represents how relations between external influences
and ideological structures considered to be endogenous are in a consistent process of
interplay in which conceptions of 'self and 'other' are attempting to reconcile with
the needs of the timesl.
Perhaps more importantly, in recognizing China's 'backwardness' and
incorporating the advancements and promises of the modern world into what was
viewed as "traditionally Chinese", Kang Youwei and the Reformist movement
produced a Chinese identity that was being pushed away from an isolationalist
identity as the 'divine center of the universe' towards a more encompassing identity
as a "great nation amongst nations". Utilizing Kang Youwei as an individual example
to represent a larger relational process alsoreiterates that 'China' as a nation exists
as a social manifestation of a vast network of interconnected relations: relations
between individuals and their environment, between the ideological and the
pragmatic, and between that which defines the 'self and that which is created (as
" ~ a r y~ i l l i a m
Theodore De and Richard John Lufrano, and Wing-tsit Chan. Sources of Chinese
Tradition. New York: Columbia UP, 2000.

other) against which to construct such definitions.
The result of the second stage in this relationalist model is the formation of a
broader 'regional/global identity', an identity that can differ from a 'national identity'.
In determining national identity, constructivist scholars often point inward, towards
political, economic, and societal structures and ideologies asking such questions as:
Are we democratic or socialist? Capitalist or communist? A Christian nation or a
secular society? However, a 'regional/global identity' is an identity that recognizes
and is defined by a perceived and internalized set of values, interests, practices, and
responsibilities bounded within a particular region. It also considers the role in
which a particular actor plays in a larger system, and how an actor views itself vis-5vis those within the system. It is also important to note that not only can regional
and national identities differ, but they can also be at odds with one another. Thus,
the degree to which an actor identifies with a 'regional identity' vis-5-vis its national
identity is equally as important as the regional identity it adapts, for both have
crucial implications for its regional behavior.

Stage 3: Identity Internalization and Foreign Policy

The third stage of the relational-regionalism model, represented in figure l.l.c,
demonstrates how what was once considered 'exogenous' or belonging to the 'other'
has become a part of endogenous self-identification mechanisms. During the second
stage of the regionalism process, the interaction between 'exogenous' and
'endogenous' influences produces a regional identity in which the 'self and 'other'
become inextricably intertwined in that one cannot exist without the other (in the
third stage).

For example, by the end of the Reformist era and the subsequent founding of
the Republic of China, external relations (as seen in the relationship between
Chinese intellectuals and their foreign education) fused with classical Confucian
teachings to produce the concept of a 'self strengthening' movement. This movement,
as reflected in the term self-strengthenin, was often referred to as a purely Chinese
construct and a reflection of a new Chinese identity. In this way, foreign relations
were internalized and merged with ideas of the 'self and the founding of "New
China".
The creation of a regional identity generates new obligations and interests
that are then manifested in an actor's foreign policy behavior. In other words, foreign
policy behavior serves as an observable proxy for relational processes; it allows
international relations scholars to observe a dynamic process of relations in which an
actor has internalized an identity and is attempting to realize the goals that have
been generated in relation to this identity. As stated earlier, it is often tempting to
treat foreign policy solely as evidence of a particular 'regional identity', but while
foreign policy behavior is represented as an outcome within the third and final stage
of the model, it is by no means an end point that summarizes and concludes the
process. Rather, the third stage represents the mutually reinforcing nature of this
relationalist model, where foreign policy behavior is not only being projected
outward but generating other relations from an actor's environment that then feed
back into the actor's national/regional identity conception. Furthermore, evaluating
foreign policy solely to prove the existence of particular pre-existing identity
oversimplifies the process of relations in which such an identity is created and is
continuously evolving.

This chapter has attempted to explain the essential components of a
relationalist model that incorporates processes of relations and regional identity
construction. While the example of Kang Youwei and the Reformist movement is
useful to illustrate the model, the model is not limited to classical examples in
Chinese history. The model can also be used to explain contemporary regionalist
dynamics. Thus, the next chapter will apply the relationalist model to focus on
specific points of contestation in China's foreign policy ideology that have
engendered a chronological narrative in which relational processes have played an
essential role.

Chapter 4
Relational Processes of Identity Formation and the Evolution of China's
Regional Identity
As discussed in the previous chapter, applying a relational model to explain the
evolution of China's regional identity involves narrating such an evolution through
three stages: (I) contextualization and re-evaluation; (2) regional identity formation,
and (3) internalizationlmerging of self and other through foreign policy projection.
The two main shifts discussed in this chapter will show the process of China's
regional identity formation as evolving through these three stages. First, the shift
from Mao Zedong's leftist ideology to Deng Xiaoping's principles of 'peaceful
coexistence' and 'good-neighboring' represent a transition from stage 1 to the
beginnings of stage 2. The first section of this chapter begins with a general depiction
of the Mao Zedong era to serve as a baseline to observe the magnitude of the shift
into the Deng Xiaoping era. Next, the era of Jiang Zemin and the New Security
Concept will serve as a transitional phase signifying the end of stage 2, and Hu
Jintao's vision of a 'Harmonious Society' will serve as a demonstration of stage 3 and
the continuous, on-going nature of this regionalist process.

I. From Mao to Deng
On the eve of the founding of "New China", Mao Zedong wrote a series of
articles describing his determination that China would make a fresh start (chongqi
Zuzao) in the foreign policy arena. He declared that China would advance the

principle of "starting anew'' and "putting the house in order before inviting guests".

This launched what was known as the "leaning-to-one-side" (yibiandao) policy that
defined China's peripheral policy in the beginning stages of the Cold War. This policy
was also referred to as Mao's 'leftist' policy, as it meant that China would ally and
identify with other countries on the basis of socialist ideology. Mao's guiding policy
did include an internalized 'other,' though this other was not the East Asian region
but rather the Soviet Union. It is because of this that during this period China was
often referred to as a "regional power without a regional policy"92 and Beijing was
unable to formulate an integrated policy vis-a-vis its East Asian neighbors who
during this time were subsumed under the general term zhoubian guojia, which
simply meant a country that was in China's periphery or 'rim'93.
Scholars give several explanations for the absence of a Chinese regional policy
during this period. First, domestic policies enacted by Chairman Mao, such as the
infamous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, generated frequent internal
turmoil and policy change. These events severely limited China's foreign policy and
generated minimal consideration of a regional policy. Second, many Chinese
scholars, such as Ma Ying and Zhao Gancheng, describe a traditional 'cultural
complacency' and legacy of Sino-centrism in which China's focus pointed undeniably
inwardw. Finally, scholars such as Steven Levine argue that China's 'ambiguous
position' in Asia was "more than merely a regional actor, but still less than a global
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power," relegating them into uncertain and at times uneasy relations with East Asian
neighbors. This was further complicated by its global position, suspended within a
triangular relationship between the US and the USSR.
These factors, while partially responsible for explaining China's lack of a
regional policy, only provide for a surface account of why China lacked an identity
that included a regional, East Asian identity. In order to gain a deeper understanding
of why the Mao era lacked a clear regional identity, it is imperative to briefly address
relational processes of identity negotiation that that were unfolding during this
period.
First, China's foreign relations during this period were defined primarily by its
alliance with the Soviet Union and its 'leaning-to-one-side' principle that limited its
diplomatic relations to countries with socialist ideologies. Thus China's negotiation
of identity during this period involved a conceptualization of 'self and 'other' that
were largely based on the ideological demarcations between the Socialist Block and
the 'rest'. During this era, China had yet to normalize frequent or stable relations
with its East Asian neighbors, and its geopolitical position in the bipolar Cold War
system forced China to view its 'self and security in global rather than regional terms.
Furthermore, the East Asian region is comprised of countries with varying political
structures, cultural customs, and religious beliefs. Because it was nearly impossible
for all East Asian countries to fall into 'one side', China's policy of 'leaning' did not
encourage the relations necessary between the PRC and East Asian countries to form
a regional identips.
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This "leaning" to one side policy began to change in the late 1970s as Deng
Xiaoping assumed leadership and, after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central
Committee of the CPC, launched market-oriented economic reforms and initiated
China's 'opening up' (gaige kaifang) to the rest of the world96. During this time
China's triangular relationship between the USSR and US began to ease as the two
superpowers reached a d6tente and moved toward the end of the Cold War. The
collapse of the bipolar world system led to the development of regional blocs that
provided Chinese leaders with the opportunity to take advantage of a new
collectivism that would help to deter and counter the 'West'. In response, China
started to cooperate with neighboring countries on transnational security issues such
as illegal immigration, organized cross-border crime, drug-trafficking and
environmental pollution97. This provided the impetus for stage 1of the relationalist
model, in which China began to reevaluate itself in regards to a changing
environment. The collapse of a bipolar world structure and renewed relations with
its neighbors served as an 'external stimulus' that initiated stage 1of the relationalist
model by forcing Chinese leaders to contextualize and re-evaluate Chinese principles
96
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and residual Maoist influences according to a new political landscape

Stage I : Contextualization and Re-evaluation
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At the same time, in looking wthin the circle infigure i.i.a, Deng Xiaoping
committed himself to halting the political turmoil that had plagued domestic Chinese
politics. Most importantly China abandoned the 'leftist' ideology and proceeded to
formulate an integrated regional policy (zhoubian zhengce) based on 'good
neighboring' and a continuing commitment or reiteration of the 5 principles of
peaceful coexistence (heping gongzhu wu xiangyuanze).
The 5 Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were formed through a series of
agreements between the PRC and India in 1954 during the Mao era, but didn't
become China's guiding foreign policy ideology until the transfer of power to Deng
Xiaoping. The principles were formed within the context of decolonization and held
that independent countries would demonstrategg:

M. Chaubey, "I Establishing a New International Order on the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence: Deng Xiaoping: I11 Documents." China Report 30.2 (1994): 267-79.
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I. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-aggression

against anyone

3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs

4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful Coexistence

Though produced during the Mao era, these principles later represented a
rethinking of Chairman's Mao's anti-imperialist rhetoric by aligning it with the
current post-colonialism discourse. The emphasis placed on these principles during
the Deng Xiaoping era signaled that China was beginning to 'narrow' its selfidentification down from a global and ideological perspective to, instead, identify
with the 'third world' or a group of developing countries. Despite the fact that
Premier Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Nehru composed the agreements bilaterally
between India and China, these 5 principles were then triumphed as the guiding light
of China's foreign policy, economic development, and international relations and
signaled the beginnings of an integrative regional policy.
A study done by You Ji and Jia Qingguo describes three main trends frequently

associated with China's decision to formulate an integrative regional policy99
entering into the 1990s. First, You and Jia point towards Beijing's belief in the
prospect of a 'Pacific Century' in which China hoped that it could capitalize on the
economic growth of the Asia-Pacific and revitalize China's economy and thus became
determined to integrate itself within the regional economy. Second, the emergence of
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a 'new Asianism' held that the success of Asian modernization lajr in its unique
values and cultural practices. This 'Asianization' as a rationalization behind
economic development was particularly appealing to Chinese leaders who wanted to
challenge Western 'ideological and economic centrality' and thus sought to further
advance this trend by working closely with its Asian neighbors.
Despite the accuracy of these descriptions, the reasons used to explain
China's dramatic shift in its regional policy are all overtly realist and interest-based,
under-emphasizing the constructivist framework through which interests are viewed
as by-products of identity. Scholars' discussions of concepts such as the 'Pacific
Century' or 'New Asianism' do not provide adequate attention to the relational
processes that gave rise to these concepts. Furthermore, a change in the polarity of
the international system is an impetus that initiated processes of identity negotiation.
Addressing only the impetus rather than this process of identity construction is
insufficient in fully elucidating China's reconceptualizations of 'self and 'other'. For
example, on December 21,1988 excerpts from Deng Xiaoping's conversation with
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India were published and entitled '-;F$%&B%%
%%!~~L$E$
or U
'A New
~ ~International
Z ~ ? ~ ' Order Should be Established with

the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as norms' in which he articulated a
response to the changing world orderloo.

loo The general world situation is changing, and every country is thinking about appropriate
new policies to establish a new international order. Hegemonism, bloc politics and treaty
organizations no longer work. Then what principle should we apply to guide the new
international relations? I have talked about this matter recently with some foreign leaders and
friends. Two things have to be done at the same time. One is to establish a new international
political order; the other is to establish a new international economic order ...and we shall go
on talking about it.

In this speech, the immediate and most important impact of the shift away from
a bipolar world structure was not necessarily to instill a sense of 'opportunity' to
counter the West. Instead, this shift initiated a process of internal reevaluation
within the PRC. As we see China is not only attempting to think about new
'appropriate policies' but also is attempting to construct a grand principle or ideology
to serve as its guide for future international relations. What is particularly significant
is the emphasis on how this shift has sparked conversation and dialogue between
China and its 'friends' and the way that Deng Xiaoping is utilizing a multilateral
institution such as the United Nations as a forum for discussion (a trend that began
during the Deng Xiaoping era and continues today). Furthermore, Deng ends his
speech by proclaiming, "And we shall go on talking about it" calls for a sustained
and constant dialogue. Thus the change in the world system, coupled with China's
internal reform were impetuses that gave rise to both external and internal reflection,
dialogue, and most importantly initiated a wave of relations between the PRC and
neighboring countries.

Deng's New Policies vis-d-vis Security and Development

This new wave of relations impacted Chinese foreign policy particularly in the
areas of security and development. During this period, China made unprecedented
efforts not only to engage in dialogue with its neighbors to solve disputes, but also
began to link security and development when it espoused goals of 'joint
development' and 'mutual trust'.

As China began normalizing relations with its neighbors it also began to

integrate a new sense of 'peripheral consciousness' into its national identity.
Recognizing that isolation was both impossible and unfavorable, Chinese leaders
constructed a China that acknowledged its position as a 'neighbor amongst
neighbors'. This in turn influenced the ways in which Chinese interests were
manifested and negotiated within its regional foreign policy. This is particularly
evident in the ways in which China's 'Good Neighboring' policy influenced its
processes of dispute settlement and security policy vis-A-vis its neighbors. For
example, China began to initiate creative approaches in "laying aside disputes and
engaging in joint exploitation'' (gezhizhengyi gongtongkaifa) for the peaceful
resolution of disputes between the PRC and periphery countries, particularly those
within the South China Sea. In regards to the territorial and sea disputes that
became prominent with new developments in the international system, Deng
Xiaoping proposed a new way of thinking about joint development which he believed
could eliminate the problems accumulated for years.
As Liu Huaqiu, the CPC's director of the Central Foreign Affairs Office stated in

China advocates dialogues and negotiations with other countries as equals in
dealing with the historical disputes over boundaries, territorial lands, and
territorial seas and seeks fair and reasonable solutions. Disputes that cannot be
settled immediately may be set aside temporarily as the parties seek common
ground while reserving differences without letting those differences affect the
normal relations between two countrieslol.

lo' Liu Huaqiu, "Zhongguojiang yiongyuan zhixing dudi zhizhu de waijiao zhengce" [China Will
Always Pursue Peaceful Foreign Policy of Independence and Self-determination], Quishi, no. 23
(December 1997):38.

As this passage demonstrates, Deng's regime raised an unprecedented issue
regarding whether China could engage in joint development, while compromising on
the issue of sovereignty in dispute settlements. Most importantly, this initiative not
only revealed new solutions for resolving territorial issues but also helped to
engender normalized relations between China and peripheral countries by
promoting dialogue, cooperation, and negotiation.
This move would also influence future relations in the decades to come as, for
example, in 2002 when China laid the foundation for the peaceful resolution of
issues regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and played a pivotal role
in assuaging tensions by signing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea. Additionally, the agreements between China and Vietnam on the
delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf and fishery cooperation, coupled with its agreement
with the Philippines and Vietnam oil companies on joint exploration of oil reserves
in the South China Sea also displayed and reinforced China's commitment to lay
aside disputes for joint exploitation.
Increased 'country-to-country' relations also began to redefine China's stances
on security and economic development. China began to consider the principles of
peaceful coexistence as the main impetus behind its overall goal of peaceful
development. Whereas Chairman Mao advocated 'cleaning the house before inviting
guests', Deng believed in a synergy between economic development and a foreign
policy that would reinvigorate relations, improve security cooperation between
China and its periphery, while still bestowing primacy on economic growth and
domestic stability. As he stated on December 21,1988, without development and

cooperation, there would be "No genuine Asia-Pacific century or Asian century"lo2.
As a result China became more active in regional and international forums such as
the United Nations, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asian Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), and taking a leadership role in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). China also displayed noteworthy initiative during this period,
collaborating with ASEAN to publish the Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of
Non-Traditional Security Issues in order to safeguard regional security and stability,
while also becoming the first regional power to formally join the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

China's Inward Gaze Towards Economic Growth

The shift from Mao's 'leftist' yibiandao policy to Deng Xiaoping's policy of
adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and 'Good Neighboring'
signaled that China no longer viewed itself in relation to other countries solely on the
basis of ideological divisions but instead was becoming more integrative in that the
way it identified with the rest of the world.
However, despite the significance of this shift in China's conceptualizations of
identity and its changes in foreign policy, it did not necessarily demonstrate China's
internalization of a regional or East Asian identity. While it did convey China's
willingness to reach its diplomatic hands outward, its gaze was still primarily inward
and focused on attaining domestic stability through economic growth. As Deng
Xiaoping stated on February 22,1984, while visiting with a delegation from the

lo2 From his speech 'A New International Order Should be Established with the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence as Norms'.

Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University in
Washington, D.C., China would continue to "observe" the international system, due
to the fact that China would need "at least twenty years to concentrate on our
domestic development". Furthermore on March 3rd, 1990 Deng Xiaoping gave a
speech to leading members of the Central Committee stating103:
The crucial factor is economic growth, which will be reflected in a gradual rise
in living standards. Only when people have felt the tangible benefits that come
with stability and with the current systems and policies will there be true
stability. No matter how the international situation changes, so long as we can
ensure appropriate economic growth, we shall stand firm as Mount Tai.

From this passage the primacy given to economic growth and domestic
stability is strikingly apparent. This prioritization of economic growth, as Suisheng
Zhao stated, undoubtedly influenced China's periphery policyl04. This was evident in
their efforts to coordinate diplomacy along with the inception of market-oriented
reforms in-line with "serving domestic economic construction" (waijiaofuwu yu
guoneijingji jiangshe)105. Furthermore, the last sentence of the passage indicates
Deng Xiaoping's belief that economic growth will afford China an immunity to any
challenges brought upon by changes in the "international situation". In this way,
Deng creates a degree of separation between China and the 'international',
demonstrating China's movement away from an identity that is defined global terms.
Finally, by invoking the image of Mount Tai, one of China's foremost sacred
mountain and a symbol of birth and renewal, Deng Xiaoping eludes to the birth of a
new, improved, China.
'03 Deng Xiaoping. "The International Situation and Economic Problems." Talk with Leading
Members of the Central Committee. China, Beijing. 3 Mar. 1990.
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Thus with its gaze inward, though with an outreach strategy that was as much
regional as it was global, it is unsurprising that Chinese-East Asian relations, while
improving, lacked the robustness and dynamism necessary to cause China to
prioritize the development of an 'East Asian Community', a comprehensively tailored
East Asian regionalist policy, or internalize a regional identity. Under Deng, China
made a concerted and unprecedented effort to involve itself in East Asian forums
and affairs, yet while China no longer defined itself solely on ideological or global
power terms, its relations with East Asian countries did not lead to a re-evaluation of
'self and 'other' in which 'East Asia' became a part of China's self-conceptualization
and identity. East Asian countries were still very much an 'other' amongst many,
albeit an 'other' with whom China would strive to live in 'peaceful coexistence'. In
other words, while China began to develop a 'periphery consciousness' (the outcome
of the external impetus on internal dynamics in stage 1) it was yet to fully develop an
'East Asian consciousness' (which we see in stages 2 and 3) within its processes of
identity construction.

11. The New Security Concept (%%23&!) and the Beginnings of Change

With the deterioration of the Cold War world structure and Deng Xiaoping's
reforms well underway, Jiang Zemin succeeded his predecessor on March 2p,1998.
Under Jiang, the PRC began a process in which it reconciled its unique position as
"more than a regional actor, but less than a world power,'' beginning to define itself
in regional rather than global terms. This was enabled by the normalization of
relations between China likewise and various East Asian countries that occurred
during the 1990s. China normalized relations with influential countries in Southeast

Asia during the early 1990s: Indonesia (August 8, ~ g g o )Singapore
,
(October 3,
lggo), Brunei (September 30, iggi), and Vietnam (November 1991). China then
turned its attention northwest as it formalized diplomatic relations with South Korea
on August 24,1992.
As China's regional relations increased, the PRC began to transform 'regional
involvement' into 'regional commitment' and began to move away from Deng
Xiaoping's 'Observer' status towards the role of regional actor, often describing itself
as an 'active participant'. In 1996 President Jiang Zemin released what is hailed as
the 'New Security Concept', which held that, given the precipitous rise of nontraditional security issues, the changing nature of the Asia-Pacific region, and
China's commitment to the region, China would put forward the initiative that
countries in the region should cultivate a new concept of security focusing on
enhancing trust through dialogue and promoted security through cooperationl06.
At the core of China's New Security Concept was the idea that such a regional
commitment should include mutual benefit, equality, mutual trust, coordination and
most importantly, promoting confidence-building interactions. In order to attain
such goals China called upon countries within the region to build their national and
regional security policy on the basis of the followinglo7:
To conduct cooperation on the basis of the UN Charter, the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence and other widely recognized norms governing international
relations, and give full play to the leading role of the United Nations;
To peacefully resolve territorial and border disputes and other controversial issues
through negotiations;
To reform and improve the existing international economic and financial
organizations and promote common prosperity in line with the principle of
lo6 From the PRC's 2002
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reciprocity and mutual benefit and common development;
To place emphasis on non-traditional security areas such as combating terrorism
and transnational crimes, in addition to the traditional security areas like preventing
foreign invasion and safeguarding territorial integrity;
To conduct effective disarmament and arms control with broad participation in line
with the principle of justice, comprehensiveness, rationality and balance, prevent
the proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, uphold the current
international arms control and disarmament regime and refrain from arms race.

In these five goals we are able to see how the 'New Security Concept' reiterated
components of Deng Xiaoping's 'Peaceful Coexistence' by continuing to advance the
peaceful resolution of the territorial disputes, an important role for the United
Nations, and a commitment to economic prosperity based on principles of mutual
benefit and joint development. However we are also able to see, especially in the last
two objectives, that China is not only adhering to Deng's core principles, but is also
taking the initiative on regional issues regarding non-traditional security concerns
and arms control.
In the New Security Concept, we can see how the prior increase in relations
shift identity and strategy. Jiang Zemin's New Security Concept builds upon
commitments generated by the normalization of relations between China and its
neighbors through Deng's 'peaceful coexistence' and 'Good Neighboring' policy. In
this way, we begin to see the interplay described in stage 2 of the relationalist model,
between influences that are thought to be endogenous (core values of Deng
Xiaoping's era of reform) with external influences (regional security concerns).

-
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However in comparison with Deng's guiding ideology of 'peaceful coexistence',
the New Security Concept does not place China's economic security and development
solely at the forefront. The New Security Concept represents more than an effort to
create a peaceful environment to promote China's development. Instead it signals
that China has identified with the region and subsequently has begun to view its own
interests as inextricably intertwined with regional conditions. In this way, we see
how China's initiative conveys a sense of 'responsibility' that is attained through ingroup identification.
Finally, the significance of the term 'confidence-building' is worth addressing as
it is frequently mentioned during various speeches that China has delivered to
regional forums such as APEC and the ARF, and is referenced within its government
White Papers. The New Security Concept advocates participating in 'confidencebuilding dialogue', establishing 'confidence-building mechanisms', and promoting
policies that 'build confidence'. Confidence-building is undoubtedly a central tenet of
the New Security Concept, but its importance lies within the question of 'confidence
in whom or what?' This question is later answered in China's 'Position Paper on The
New Security Concept' where China details how its actions have promoted
confidence-building interactions across the East Asian region. For example, the PRC
statedlo?
China sees the economic exchange and interaction as an important avenue to a
lasting security in its surrounding area. As an active participant in regional
108
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economic cooperation of various kinds, China is working closely with other
countries in the region for a multi-channel, multi-dimensional and multi-faceted
new economic cooperation in this part of the world. The development of the
regional economic cooperation mechanisms as spearheaded by the 10+3
cooperation in East Asia have not only brought real and tangible economic
benefits to the countries concerned, but also enhanced the mutual exchange,
mutual trust and cooperation between all parties involved, thus contributing to
the security and stability of the region.

In this passage we can see how China is attempting to enhance a confidence or
faith within regional relations and interactions. The Chinese word for confidence (B
is synonymous with the English-word'faith'. The term BE refers to faith or
confidence in something or someone and is necessarily a relational term. The
'confidence' that China is attempting to build is directed towards the East Asian
region and regional cooperation mechanisms. Its goals are 'mutual' and 'regional' in
nature, suggesting that all countries within the region share common goals, interests,
and the benefits of regional peace and prosperity. Finally the use of the verb 'build'

(jianshe), as opposed to 'promote' or 'encourage', signals an on-going process or
project rather than an endorsement or tacit acknowledgement, as well as a new
identity as a an active 'builder'. China's emphasis on 'processes' and relations that
build confidence in an Asian Security Community indicates its identification with the
region and the development of an 'East Asian consciousness'. Furthermore, by
identifying issues, interests, and responsibilities that are East Asian, we are able to

observe the products of regional identity formation (stage 2) in which a regional
identity works to redefine national interests into regional objectives.
For example, the beginnings of China's internalization of a regional identity can
be observed through its relations with ASEAN and the ARF. Following normalization

of relations with a number of Southeast Asian countries, China was then invited to
attend the ASEAN post-Ministerial Conference in lggl and later became ASEAN's
comprehensive dialogue partner in 1996. Since then China been an active participant
in what Chinese leaders have termed the "shanhuijizhi" (three meeting mechanism)
of the ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting, Enlarged ASEAN Foreign Ministerial
Meeting, and the ARFlo9.
The continuing influence of normalized and increased relations between China
and Southeast Asia on China's regional policy was especially evident during the 1997
Asian Financial Crisis. During the crisis many East Asian countries, especially those
within Southeast Asia, suffered from slumping currencies, devalued asset and stock
prices, and a rise in private debt. While China was not unscathed by the crisis, it
emerged as the stable force within East Asia. Many speculated that China would
devalue its currency, initiating competitive devaluation and 'beggar thy neighbor'
competition across the region. The devaluation of the RMB would have devastated
recovery efforts and exacerbated the vulnerable condition of the economies of those
countries most affected by the crisis. Despite economic pressures, premier Zhu
Rongyi assured that China would maintain the value of the RMB. Chinese leaders
then committed itself to a 'stand-by Asia' policy and committed billions of dollars to
afflicted Southeast Asian countriesllo.
China's decision to maintain the value of the RMB was not simply a rhetorical
or strategic maneuver; it demonstrated a sense of 'Asian solidarity', and revealed

lo9 Yan, Zhongguo

de Jueqi [The Rise of China], p. 287
Elizabeth Economy, "China's Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for the United States." Journal
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China's identification and commitment to the region. As stage 2 of the model shows,
identity influences foreign policy decisions by producing a particular configuration of
interests, goals, and responsibilities related to the existing identity. As discussed
earlier, for the last few decades China's top priority has undoubtedly been sustained
economic growth. Rejecting the economic opportunity to capitalize on the crisis and
potentially further advance its position in the world economy conveyed a sense of
'togetherness' to East Asian countries. This simultaneously engendered further
relations between the PRC and Southeast Asia that served to propagate a notion of
an East Asian 'shared responsibility' and 'mutual dependence'. China's aid tacitly
required Southeast Asian countries to work alongside China and maintain a degree
of transparency when discussing or planning economic recovery reformslll. At the
first ASEAN-plus-1 summit in December 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin met
with the nine leaders of ASEAN in Kuala Lumpur and published a joint declaration
to establish a mutual-trust partnership oriented towards a 21~tcentury of 'good
neighboring'.
The ASEAN example highlights how Chinese interests and responsibilities were
viewed and redefined as East Asian interests and responsibilities. Its 'Stand By Asia'
policy demonstrated its willingness to embrace the responsibilities generated by an
internalization of a regional identity rather than giving into domestic economic
interests and pressures. Critics skeptical of China's motivations are quick to dismiss
China's commitment to Southeast Asia as a purely strategic maneuver to increase
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Chinese influence in the East Asian regionll2. However, such a view ignores the
previously elucidated narrative in which China's increased and improved relations
with Southeast Asia before the crisis helped to cultivate a strengthening regional
identity. China's Southeast Asian foreign policy was not purely strategic, when
considered in relation to a regional identity; the relations that precipitated the crisis
played an important role in re-enforcing a regional identity, compelling China to
adapt its 'stand by Asia' policy, and precipitated the beginnings of stage 3 of the
relationalist model: InternalizationjMerging of Self and Other through Foreign
Policy Projection.

Into the 21st Century: Hu Jintao's 'Harmonious world'
China's internalization of a regional identity has had the most observable
influence on China's foreign policy during the Hu Jintao era that began in 2002
when Hu assumed the role of General Secretary of the Community Party of China
before assuming the role of President of the People's Republic of China in 2003. At
the time of Hu's ascension, I have argued that China had already internalized a
regional identity that encapsulated notions of shared East Asian interests, values,
and responsibilities. This was projected and can be observed through China's grand
foreign policy during the Hu Jintao era as iterated in a variety of regional forums.
For example, in 2002 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan presented a speech at the
ASEAN plus China, Japan, and Korea Foreign Minister's Meeting were he stated:
China is member of Asia as well as the largest developing country in the region of
East Asia. Some countries tend to portray East Asia as a source of frictions and
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conflicts. In fact, for a long period of time, and even in the wake of the Asian financial
crisis, East Asia has enjoyed the fastest economic growth in the world, and seeking
economic development has always been the central task for the relevant countries in
the region. The strengthening of regional cooperation will provide a continuous
impetus to East Asian development. I am fully convinced that as long as we make
joint efforts to enhance cooperation and promote development, we will realize lasting
peace, stability and prosperity in East Asia.

He later went on to speak at the 12th annual APEC Economic Leaders Meeting in
2004, delivering a powerful speech in which he called upon East Asian leaders to
remain committed to their responsibilities:
In short, the vast expanse of Asia and the Pacific is our common home, and ensuring
its continued development and prosperity our shared responsibility.

Within these excerpts of speeches, we are able to observe a rhetoric that
contains the palpable 'in-group7identification expected during the third stage of the
relationalist model. As seen in the figure below, an internalization of an "East Asian"
identity exists when East Asia is no longer 'outside' the circle, or just an external
influence, but rather has become part of an endogenous sense of 'self.
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As discussed in earlier chapters, this is in direct comparison with the 'out-group'
identification that scholars have commented on vis-A-vis China's identification with
global superpowers. The constant reiteration of 'East Asia' and 'East Asian'
development evokes a strong sense of togetherness. This is reinforced by China's

assertion that "some countries tend to portray East Asia as a source of frictions and
conflicts" which conveys a degree of separatism from those 'other countries' and
their misguided attempts to depict 'East Asia'. Where it was once China alone who
would stand firm as Mount Tai, guarded from the international situation, China no
longer solely identified itself as a 'sacred mountain' made strong by economic
growth. Instead it began to view itself as East Asian, "a force to be reckoned with in
today's world from political, economic, cultural and geographical perspectives."
China under Deng Xiaoping believed that regional relations and dialogue would
help to foster China's economic growth. And as previously discussed, when referring
to regional cooperation, the PRC used such terms as 'mutual development', 'joint
exploitation', or the 'development of the East Asian region'. Within this passage
China chooses instead to state, "the strengthening of regional cooperation will
provide a continuous impetus to East Asian development". The notion of 'East Asian
development' in contrast with 'the development of the East Asian region' transcends
a definition of regional development characterized by a shared geographic location.
Instead a region has now become a 'common home' with shared goals, interests, and
responsibilities.
This regional identification was not only conveyed through regional forums but
through domestic channels as well. Government White Papers on China's Defense
policy utilizes nearly identical rhetoric to advocate its goal of 'BU-Rfib E%&el$
&%
3% %8N %.$I%''

or "deepening regional security cooperation with Asian

characteristics" (emphasis a d d e d ) ~
Despite previously discussed scholars who have identified the lack of shared
'Asian characteristics' as an impediment to East Asian regionalism, China's
statements suggest that China has internalized a conceptualization of itself as
determined by 'Asian Characteristics'. This term is also significant in that China
employed a similar concept or notion of 'Chinese Characteristics' during the
beginning of the Deng Xiaoping era when Deng's often hailed his reforms as
'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics"ll4. This is not to say that Asian
characteristics have replaced Chinese characteristics' or that Chinese characteristics
have transformed into Asian characteristics. Instead this term highlights the shift
from Deng Xiaoping emphasis on Chinese solidarity and characteristics towards the
21Stcentury that

saw a gradual embracement of an East Asian identity.

century also saw a merging of the Chinese 'self and
The beginnings of the 21~f
East Asian 'other'-as described in stage 3 of the relationalist model-within
processes of identity construction. China's relations with its East Asian neighbors
were steadily increasing and improving; as a result, the concept of an 'Asian
Community' was no longer simply a goal to work towards but a reality to improve
upon. As previously discussed, East Asia was still very much a recognized 'other'
during the Mao and Deng eras. While Hu Jintao and the PRC still recognized the
differences between itself and its East Asian neighbors, its identification with the
East Asian community became an inextricable influence on the ways in which China
Translated by author from China's 2002 White Paper on National Defense. "Full Text" of white
paper issued by the PRC Information Office of State Council on g December, 2002: "China's National
Defense in 2002"
'I4 From Professor Sidney J. Gluck's presentation at the Philosophy Conference Chinese Academy of
Sciences, Beijing China held on October 30 and 31 2000.

viewed itself.
In an interview with professor Qingmin, professor of Political Science and CPP
member at the University of Beijing, he stated that during the 21st century China has
begun to move away from a tendency to view itself in opposition with its East Asian
neighbors. Instead, he claims, China's East Asian relations have helped to engender a
Chinese identity constructed through identification rather than juxtaposition of a
perceived 'collective' or 'regional' identitylls. Qingmen also reiterated that the CCP
supported and remained committed to former Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad
Mahathir's statement that, "East Asian is not just East Asia geographically-it is also
culturally East Asian"ll6. Finally professor Qingmin referenced Ma Ying and Zhao
Gancheng's argument that China has become "a China of its periphery", and that a
periphery should no longer be viewed solely as "a periphery of China"ll7. In this way
China has incorporated itself into its a periphery (and likewise the periphery as
become a part of itself), rather than viewing its periphery as outside itself.
Thus, the beginnings of the a l s t century saw two significant developments: the
transformation of 'East Asia' from a geographic space into a shared identity
comprised of East Asian characteristics and the internalization of this regional
identity as seen in PRC statements of its interests, commitments, and
responsibilities. Just as in the earlier story of Kang Youwei and the Reformist
movement, influences from a 'Western other' merged with a traditional Chinese 'self
to form a "new China'' committed to curing its "backwardness". This merging of the
l5 Translated by author from an interview done in the Spring of 2010 while author was studying at
the University of Beijing, China.
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'other' into process of 'self construction is apparent in the shift from Deng
Xiaoping's 'Peaceful Coexistence' to Hu Jintao's vision of a 'Harmonious Society'.

Building A 'Harmonious World' ($u%&$?)
Hu Jintao's vision of a 'Harmonious World'--China's most recent guiding
ideology-represents not only a significant departure from Deng Xiaoping's 'Peaceful
Coexistence,' but also represents an 'ideological shift' and 'policy projection'
(produced as in stage three of the relational model) of China's internalization of a
regional identity. Since 2005, China has articulated and promoted the concept of
'building a harmonious world' (Jianshe hexie shijie) as the core tenet and guiding
principle of its foreign policyll8. The concept, which is derived from ancient
Confucian teachings, was introduced by Hu Jintao at the Summit of the APEC forum
in Busan in November 2005, where it was hailed as China's new "preferred model of
regional cooperation and community building9'l1g.Such a world, according to Hu,
would be based on multilateralism, dialogue, and mutually beneficial cooperation
that would ensure lasting peace and prosperity within the region.
Following the unveiling of China's 'Harmonious World', the PRC engaged in a
concerted effort to extol the concept in both regional and domestic forums. Since
2005, domestic media and government speeches and policy documents have
identified China's 'harmonious world' as a defining characteristic of its ideal

'I8 President Hu Jintao first floated the idea of 'building a harmonious world' at the United Nations
World Summit on September 15th 2005.
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societyl20. Furthermore, in December 2005, the Chinese government released a
White Paper entitled 'China's Peaceful Development Road' in which it declared that
'building a harmonious world' was (+

H +/T;) 'the lofty goal of China'

(emphasis added)l21. President Hu Jintao began promoting his vision at various
regional forums held in Seoul and Hanoi in late 2005. This was later followed by
Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi's visit to the second Northeast Asian Economic
Cooperation (NAEC) Forum held in Jilin Province in 2006. In her address to a group
of East Asian foreign ministers, she expressed China's "firm commitments to
construct a harmonious and prosperous Northeast Asia"122.
Despite the attention paid to Hu Jintao's vision of a harmonious world, the
meaning of 'harmony' ($a%) within China's new guiding foreign policy ideology
remains ambiguous. Although 'harmony' is regarded as the defining feature of
traditional Chinese philosophical teaching, it lacked 'conceptual clarity' and
'systemic theorization'l23. The original texts that first articulated the concept have
been scattered throughout a number of classical works in which the concept of
'harmony' has been employed within the varying religious contexts of Daoism,
Buddhism, and Confucianism. Hence despite the goals and methods of action
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promoted by Hu Jintao's vision, the meaning behind a 'harmonious world' itself
remains ill-defined.
Despite the conceptual ambiguity of the term 'harmony', Hu Jintao's
'Harmonious World' represents a significant ideological development that
contributes to the study of regional identity, the relational model described by this
study, and East Asian regionalism for two essential reasons. First, building a
harmonious world represents a significant step forward and away from Deng
Xiaoping's principles of 'Peaceful Coexistence' and Jiang Zemin's 'New Security
Concept'. For example, Hu Jintao's vision placed an unprecedented emphasis on
multilateral dialogue and cooperation. In the past China developed its relationships
with neighboring countries primarily on a bilateral basisl24. As the 21st century
progressed, earlier attempts to engage in regional forums in the late go's were
greatly enhanced and valued by Chinese leaders. Furthermore, in previous eras
China focused primarily on its political relations with its East Asian neighbors,
emphasizing its own security and economic development. However, President Hu
built upon his predecessor's belief, extending it to include shared East Asian
responsibilities, interests, and goals by emphasizing regional security and economic
cooperation. This unprecedented effort towards regional cooperation was geared not
only toward building a peaceful or amicable neighborhood (mulin), but also a
'tranquil neighborhood' (anlin) and a mutually 'prosperous neighborhood' (fi_llin)125.
The concept of a 'harmonious world', like Jiang Zemin's 'New Security
Concept', represented an embracing of China's role as a an 'iniator' rather than a

124 Zhang, pg. 22
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mere 'observer' or 'participant' (as in the Deng Xiaoping era). However unlike Jiang
Zemin, Hu Jintao's vision not only conveys a China that is obligated to take regional
initiative in solving regional issues, but a China that has the intention and ability to
influence regional norms on East Asian cooperation, coordination, and dialogue.
Lastly, the regional order proposed by the 'Harmonious World' represents an
internalized sense of regional 'togetherness'.
The new regional order articulated by Hu Jintao depicts a model of integration
and community-building that is East Asian and in direct opposition to a European
'other' and the European Union regional model. As Dr. Zhang Jian states, the
Chinese vision of a 'harmonious' regional community:
Represents a different understanding of and approach to regional integration and
community-building from that associated with the development of the European
Union. While the substance of the concept of a harmonious world is still developing,
Beijing's recent active and successful engagement with its neighboring countries and
regional multilateral institutions demonstrates its increasing intentions and ability
to influence both the normative structure of emerging regional intera~tionsl*~.

Dr. Zhang's argument suggests that East Asian regional integration does not
resemble the European Union model. More importantly, he suggests that this
represents more than a difference in approaches or 'structures' but in the very ways
in which East Asian countries understand and define regional integration. Thus,
unlike previous eras, Professor Zhang proposes that Hu Jintao's 'Harmonious World'
concept represents one of the first attempts of the PRC to think of 'regionalism' (f&k

%X)in a conceptually normative and structurally formative way.
While Deng Xiaoping and his successor Jiang Zemin emphasized the
importance of regional relations, it was not until Hu Jintao's goal of building a
126 Zhang, pg. 10

harmonious world that China began to promote a guiding ideology that could be
thought of as a model for East Asian regionalism. For example, critics of East Asian
regionalism have often argued that regionalism has been unsuccessful in the region
due to the overwhelming political, social, economic and cultural differences between
East Asian countries. As discussed in Chapter I, this argument holds that because of
these differences, East Asia will be unable to achieve the "success" attained by the

EU. China's 'Harmonious World' suggests a regionalist model that does not seek
'harmony' in institutionalized uniformity, but rather seeks to promote 'he er bu tong'
(harmony without sameness). According to this view, 'sameness' (tong) is perceived
as leading to 'disharmony': according to Confucius' famous dictum 'jun zi he er bu
tong, xiao ren tong er bu he ', the gentleman seeks harmony not uniformity, while a

vulgar man seeks uniformity not harmony. As former PRC president Jiang Zemin

That is to say, harmony but not sameness; reserving differences without coming
into conflict. Harmony promotes co- existence and co-prosperity; whereas
differences foster mutual complementation and mutual support.

In this way, China's 'Harmonious World' transforms what regionalist scholars
have identified as an impediment to regionalism into a vital component of achieving
harmony within the East Asian region. Instead of attempting to resolve differences
bilaterally through political relations, China under the leadership of Hu Jintao began
instead to advance an ideological framework by which differences can be resolved
and state sovereignty respected within larger regionalist relations. Thus, the
articulation of a 'harmonious world' is not only a declaration of China's intentions
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regarding its behavior in regional affairs but is also an articulation of its preferred
regional orderl28. While the 'harmonious world' can not be defined solely as an 'East
Asian' policy, it is China's first guiding ideology that proposes a broad regional
framework and a particular way of thinking about regionalism while also thinking
about itself in regional terms.
The second reason that Hu Jintao's Harmonious World is of great significance
is that it demonstrates the ability of relations to generate a regional identity that can
then be observed through 'policy projection' and ideological shifts. While many
skeptics dismiss China's 'harmonious world' as another propagandistic effort to
mask its overall goal of accumulating power and influence, Chinese academics take
the idea quite seriouslyl29. According to most Chinese scholars, building a
'harmonious world' is not merely a result of China's rising influence or economic
clout. Instead, it is a 'projection' of goals, principles, and values that were generated
through increased relations with its East Asian neighbors. Thus, the very idea of a
'harmonious world' has grown out of Beijing's "increasing confidence derived from
the positive experiences of its recent engagement with neighboring co~ntries"~30.
According to Dr. Zhang, China's East Asian relations have promoted a "growing
convergence of norms concerning regional community-building between China and
respective regional countries involved"l31. In this way China's vision of a
'Harmonious World' is not merely an impetus or framework for future relations, but
Zhang, pg. 8
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rather is a product and projection of an ideological shift generated by relational
processes of regional identity construction and internalization.
As previously discussed, the concept of a 'Harmonious World' can not solely be
explained either by endogenous factors-Chinese philosophy, Confucian teachingsor by exogenous shocks to Chinese identity. Instead it represents a fusion of classical
concepts with an identification with the East Asian region, the influence of external
relations, and a merging of the 'other' within internal conceptualizations of 'self.
This merging of 'self and 'other' exemplifies Jackson and Nexon's concept of
'yoking'. As discussed in earlier chapters, 'yoking' argues that in a relational view of
identity, the 'self and the 'other' are not presupposed manifestations generated by
entities. Instead, since relations precede entities, constructs of 'self and 'other' can
change and merge within developing relations.
Accordingly, China's academic and policy community are in a general
agreement that Hu Jintao's 'harmonious world' is not only vision of how China is to
guide its foreign relations, but is more importantly a 'projection of the Chinese
dream'l32. For example, in 2006 the China Association of International Studies and
various Chinese institutions organized a conference on the 'harmonious world'.
During this conference, Wu Jianmin, the President of China's Foreign Affairs hailed
the 'harmonious world' as a 'Chinese dream' in which China shares its opportunities
and development with its neighborsl33.
Hu Jintao's 'harmonious world' incorporates and promotes ideas of mutual
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cooperation, multilateral dialogue, the peaceful resolution of difference, and an
identification with the East Asian region. This concept can not simply be defined as a

foreign policy objective of China. Instead it is a part of a larger vision and process in
which an internalization of a regional identity has generated a formative regionalist
framework that not only guides East Asian relations but is also produced by them.

From Mao to Hu and the Relational Model
The above narrative has attempted to show how China's relations with other
East Asian countries have contributed to the formation of a regional identity that has
subsequently generated China's East Asian interests, commitments, and
responsibilities. As stated previously, the above narrative was also intended to
demonstrate how a relational model can be applied when attempting to revise
standard interpretations of East Asian regionalism and China's regional identity
construction.
The shift from Mao's leftist (yibiandao) policy to Deng Xiaoping's principles of
'peaceful coexistence' demonstrates the model's initial stage of contextualization and
re-evaluation. Just as the foreign experiences of Chinese political thinkers and
reformers, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, initiated a movement in which China
could no longer ignore its 'backwardness' in relation to the West, Deng's coming to
power and increasing periphery relations revealed that China could no longer remain
in relative isolation.
Jiang Zemin's 'New Security Concept' marked the beginnings of stage 2, during
which China was beginning to demonstrate an identification with East Asia, not only
as a geographic region but as a 'common home' in which members shared East Asian

values, goals, and responsibilities. This era, in which Deng Xiaoping was still a
prominent influence, demonstrates what stage 2 referred to as an interplay between
'endogenous' and 'exogenous' influences. While China still retained some of Deng
Xiaoping's 'inward gaze' towards achieving domestic stability, relations with its
neighbors were steadily improving and creating a sense of 'Asian togetherness' (as
seen in China's 'Stand By Asia' approach during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis).
Thus, just as Kang Youwei and the Reformist movement reshaped Chinese identity
from that of the 'divine center of the universe' towards a more regional identity as a
'great national amongst nations', the 'New Security Concept' (also the product of
endogenous and exogenous influences), represented a movement away from a China
that was 'of the East Asian region' towards a country that was East Asian.
The third stage of the relational model is represented in the formulation of Hu
Jintao's 'harmonious world'. As previously stated the concept of building a
harmonious world represents an internalized regional identity and a merging of
prior constructs of 'self and 'other'. However, it is key to remember from chapter x,
and the arguments of Jackson and Nexon that the 'harmonious world' is not simply
an 'owned' concept. Instead it is generated and influenced by the increasing and
improved relations between China and its neighbors. Furthermore, as stated in
earlier chapters, policies and guiding ideologies such as the 'New Security Concept'
and the 'harmonious world' are not only significant for the particular values and
goals they espouse. As the temporal narrative in the previous chapter demonstrated,
improved relations and constant dialogue and cooperation with its East Asian
neighbors have served as a continuing impetus, initiating identity negotiation and
engendering ideological shifts. In terms of the relational model, the 'harmonious

world' represents a policy projection of the larger process of regional identity
formation and internalization, and thus the significance lies within the within the
'process' rather than the 'product'.
Through this narrative spanning across the eras of Chairman Mao Zedong and
current President Hu Jintao, we are able to see the importance of mutually reenforcing relations, shifting conceptualizations of 'self and 'other', and the use of
ideological shifts and policies as projections of points of identity negotiation and
contestation, all of which are central components of the relational model of regional
identity formation.

CONCLUSION

On October 3 0 t h 2010, East Asian leaders met in Hanoi, Vietnam at the sth
annual East Asia Summit. The events and details of the summit were covered by the
official Chinese news source Xinhua. Xinhua's article describing the summit
included a powerful image of participating leaders standing in a line spanning across
a large stage, arms intertwined. Over the picture a heading that read "Chinese
Premier Calls for Deepening East Asian Cooperation" was displayed prominently
before describing the discussions that occurred between East Asian leaders. During
the summit, Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated China's commitment towards coming
together to solve East Asian concerns, goals, and responsibilities.
The summit was hailed as a 'success' amongst Chinese leaders, yet it reflected
many of the characteristics that regionalist scholars have identified as impediments
to the East Asian regionalist project. Dialogue on issues spanning from security to
environmental protection were prioritized over talks of enhancing enforcement or
accountability mechanisms within regional institutions. Leaders expressed their
concerns and displayed a willingness to discuss East Asian issues at length yet no
formal multi-lateral agreements were produced.
While the summit may reaffirm the skepticism expressed by regionalist scholars,
its focus on 'deepening' relations further demonstrates the appropriateness of
applying a relationalist lens to the study of East Asian regionalism. I have argued
that analyzing the efficacy and effectiveness of regional institutions and agreements
may not be the most suitable way of understanding the East Asian regionalist
project. During the periods examined here, we see not only the importance of
elucidating processes of 'regional identity' construction and internalization, but also
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ways in which the study of regionalism can be expanded beyond substantialist
assumptions.
While East Asian regional institutions have not displayed a strong commitment
to regional institutionalization and diverge from the 'European Union' model of
integration, in this respect the cultivation of a 'regional identity' within and amongst
member states is significant to the study of East Asian regionalism. As shown in the
case of China, the internalization of a 'regional identity' influences the interests and
actions of member states.
This conclusion has several implications for both the study of East Asian
regionalism and the study of regionalism as a discourse. In regards to the former,
this study suggests that regional institutions should not serve as the primitives of
analysis in and of themselves, but rather should be analyzed through an exploration
of the relations that surround them. In this way East Asian regional institutions are
not the only indicators by which we can measure "success" or use for direct
comparison with the 'European Model'. Instead institutions may be viewed as visible
manifestations of relations that must be studied and observed independently-as
proxies for what is a relational process.
As my narrative describing China's ideological shifts has shown, China's
regional identity was not generated merely by the act of participating in regional
institutions. Instead, relations that were engendered through this participation
shaped the ways in which China viewed and thought about itself, initiating processes
of identity re-negotiation. Just as Hu Jintao's vision of a 'harmonious world' cannot
be dismissed simply as a product of China's rising political and economic clout, Jiang
Zemin's 'New Security Concept' cannot be solely explained by China's growing
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participation in regional institutions such as ASEAN and APEC. Rather both
ideological shifts are products of a relational process in which regional relations have
altered conceptualizations of 'self and 'other' influencing particular foreign policy
preferences and behavior.
Thus, the degree to which a member nation identifies with a region can serve as
an alternative measure of 'success' in a regionalist project. The East Asian region is
characterized by constantly changing contexts and institutions often slow to react
and change to changing contexts due to bureaucratic mechanisms. Thus analyzing
the efficacy of East Asian institutions may not provide the most accurate reflection of
current regionalist dynamics. It is imperative instead, to examine relational
processes that are more responsive and sensitive to changes in changing contexts
and relations in the region. It is not my intention to argue that the East Asian
regionalist project is a "success", but rather to suggest that the majority of the
literature has attempted to assess regionalism in East Asia on the basis of
institutional efficacy and formality alone. Nevertheless, it is completely possible that
China's goals of promoting mutual trust and cooperation through informal dialogue
may be in fact more successful in ensuring peace and prosperity than highly
formalized agreements or codified institutions.
While more research on cases other than China is obviously needed to evaluate
East Asian regionalism according to a relationalist lens, the model described in
figure 1.1 could be applied to other members states. In order to apply this model a
few considerations should be kept in mind. First, future studies may continue to
utilize points of contestation or important historical junctures as key moments in
which countries are rethinking their roles and identity vis-A-vis a particular region.

Second, this study focused on ideological shifts due to the importance placed on
guiding ideologies within Chinese foreign policy. However, points of contestation
may also be seen in particular times of crisis, important historical developments, or
other major shifts in a countries' regional behavior. It is also necessary to determine
if these conjunctures produce internal reflection instead of only a superficial
projection of certain principles to an external environment. This study has focused
on ideological shifts precisely because they are represented in both domestic and
regional forums and discussions. Simply analyzing foreign policy behavior, an
external projection, does not necessarily indicate 'self -reflection. Finally, though my
model focuses on a 'political identity' that is considered to be determined by state
leaders, it could be expanded to include socio-cultural components such as popculture other societal influences.
My project was motivated in large part by the overly substantialist nature of
current regionalist literature. The theoretical debate between relationalist and
substantialist IR theory has served as a reoccurring theme throughout this paper,
and it is through this debate that this study has attempted to rethink the ways in
which scholars approach discussions of regionalism and regionalist processes. As
discussed earlier, focusing the study of regionalism on regionalist institutions and
other regional entities may be not only unsuitable for regions such as East Asia but
also engenders a static, dominant, Western vision of a "successful" regionalist
project. Most importantly, the study of regionalism must include an emphasis on the
importance of relations instead of only on regionalist 'entities'. Relations must not be
subsumed under complete ownership of regional institutions or dismissed as foreign
policy tools by which countries promote their own agenda. The importance of

relations vis-A-vis political identity and foreign policy behavior should not be
overlooked by regionalist scholars. If we visualize political identities as a complex
web of shifting cables attempting to make sense of incoming signals, we see that
these signals are transmitted via interactions between the web of cables and external
factors. Thus, relations not only influence the ways in which signals from the
external environment are understood and internalized, but more importantly, alter
the ways in which the web is reconstructed.
As the political narrative of globalization and interdependence continues to

dominate our geopolitical landscape, regionalist efforts will undoubtedly increase. As
regional relations form dynamic networks of intertwined relations and constantly
changing contexts, alternative regionalist models and methods to observe regionalist
processes will be needed to elucidate the growing complexities of regionalism in the
21st century. The possibility of

an 'Asian' regionalist model, and the application of a

relationalist lens to the study of regionalism, is a step forward towards this endeavor.
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